Tuesday, November 11, 2014

Elections - 7. Nominations

Nomination is the procedure by which a political candidate becomes an official contender in general elections.  To be placed on the ballot so that voters can have the option to vote for a candidate, he or she needs to be validly 'nominated'.
The law on nominations is found in two places, the Constitution, and the Elections Act.  The relevant provisions of the Constitution are sections 36 and 37.  Section 36 is straightforward.  It is titled “Qualifications for elected membership”.
Qualifications for elected membership
36. Subject to the provisions of the next following section, a person shall be qualified to be elected as a member of the Assembly if, and shall not be qualified to be so elected unless, he is a person who belongs to Anguilla of twenty-one years or upwards who is registered as a voter in an electoral district in Anguilla and either—
(a) was born in Anguilla and is domiciled there at the date of his nomination for election;
or
(b) has resided in Anguilla for a period of not less than three years immediately before the date of his nomination for election and is domiciled there at that date and is the son or daughter of parents at least one of whom was born in Anguilla.
You will notice that section 36 contains 4 qualifications for a person to be capable of being validly nominated as a candidate for elections in Anguilla.  First, he or she must be a belonger of Anguilla.  Second, the candidate must be not less than 21 years of age.  Third, he or she must be registered as a voter.  That means registered as a voter in any constituency or district.  It does not say that the candidate must be a registered voter in the constituency in which he or she is running.  We all remember a few years ago, Mr Ronald Webster used to change the constituency in which he ran.  He was confident that no matter in which constituency he ran he would command the majority of voters in it.  However, as you can imagine it is more normal for a candidate to run in the constituency in which he or she lives.  But, it is important to note that that is not a legal requirement.
Fourth, the candidate must be either born in Anguilla and domiciled in Anguilla at the date of nomination, or, if the candidate was born outside of Anguilla, he or she must be the son or daughter of a born Anguillian and have resided in Anguilla for not less than 3 years before nomination.
What does that requirement for residence mean in practical terms?  Take the case of Sir Emile Gumbs who was a successful candidate in Road North constituency for many years.  As I recall, he was born in St Kitts.  But, both his mother and father were born Anguillians.  If he was resident in St Kitts and wanted to return to Anguilla to contest elections, he would have had to have resided in Anguilla for at least 3 years before he could have been qualified. 
On the other hand, take the case of a candidate who was born in Anguilla, but who resided in the USA for many years, and who decides to run as in general elections in Anguilla.  That would not present any obstacle, as the person is a born Anguillian.  Once that person returns to Anguilla before the elections, and has the intention of making Anguilla his or her home, that person does not need to have resided here for any particular number of years before being nominated. 
Not so with the Anguillian who was born outside of Anguilla.  If a candidate was born, eg, in the USA to Anguillian parents, he or she may be qualified to run as a candidate.  But, there is a residence qualification.  He or she must come back to Anguilla and reside here for at least 3 years before he or she can be validly nominated. 
I am not going to touch on the requirement for domicile.  Domicile is for all intents and purposes an impractical test.  You are domiciled where you intend to spend the rest of your life.  If you are resident in New York, but intend to come back to Anguilla one day and spend the rest of your days here, you are said to be 'domiciled' in Anguilla.  Once you tell me that it is your intention to die in your old age in Anguilla, I have to say that you are domiciled in Anguilla.  But, who is able to get into your head to test the truthfulness of your assertion that, although you are residing in New York, and have no further apparent connection with Anguilla, you intend to spend the balance of your life here?  So, domicile exists only in the mind of the person who claims it.  It is not something capable of independent, objective testing.
This fourth qualification of birth and residence has to do with the candidate's connection with Anguilla.  It is not enough that he or she is a belonger of Anguilla.  It that was so, it would mean that any one of the many non-Anguillians who have become belongers over the past four decades would be able to run as a political candidate.  In fact, they will not meet this fourth qualification, and a belonger who has no connection by birth with Anguilla is disqualified from being a candidate in elections.
The second section of the Constitution which governs who can be nominated as a candidate is section 37.
Disqualification for nominated or elected membership
37. (1) No person shall be qualified to be nominated or elected as a member of the Assembly who—
(a) is, by virtue of his own act, under any acknowledgement of allegiance, obedience or adherence to a foreign power or state;
(b) is a minister of religion;
(c) holds or is acting in any office of emolument in the service of the Crown;
(d) is an undischarged bankrupt, having been adjudged or otherwise declared bankrupt under any law in force in any country;
(e) is a person certified to be insane or otherwise adjudged to be of unsound mind under any law in force in Anguilla;
(f) is under sentence of death imposed on him by a court of law in any country or is under a sentence of imprisonment (by whatever name called) exceeding twelve months imposed on him by such a court or substituted by competent authority for some other sentence imposed on him by such a court, provided that the acts constituting the offence for which such sentence was imposed would, if committed in Anguilla, have constituted an offence under the law of Anguilla; or
(g) is disqualified for membership of the Assembly by any law in force in Anguilla relating to offences connected with elections.
(2) In this section “minister of religion” means any person in holy orders and any other person the functions of whose principal occupation include teaching or preaching in any congregation for religious worship.
These are what are called the disqualifications for membership in the House of Assembly.  The first one is what we call the foreign naturalisation clause.  It says that if after being born as an Anguillian you have come under an acknowledgment of allegiance, obedience or adherence to a foreign power or state, then you are disqualified from running as a candidate.  Note that the fact that a candidate has a second passport does not automatically disqualify the candidate.  He or she might have been born in a foreign country.  Even if he or she has become a foreign naturalised person, or taken out a passport in a foreign country, that does not mean that a candidate is automatically become disqualified.  It will take a witness who is an expert in the foreign citizenship law to testify before the judge that taking out, eg, US citizenship by an Anguillian, amounts to that coming under acknowledgment of allegiance, obedience or adherence to that foreign power or state which is prohibited.  It is not for the Supervisor of Elections or the Returning Officer to decide, but for a judge.
The reasons for the disqualification for swearing allegiance to a foreign power are historical.  They do not make much sense to us in Anguilla, except in a historical way.  It appears it was originally meant to stop Englishmen who had become German or French citizens, these countries being traditional enemies of England, from becoming members of the British Parliament.  In the case of us in Anguilla, where for generations our young people were forced for economic reasons to emigrate overseas and to live in, and take out rights in, other countries such as the USA, that objection to foreign citizenship is in my opinion no longer valid.  The fact that an Anguillian takes out a foreign citizenship in order to fit in, and earn a good living, in a foreign country should never disqualify that Anguillian from coming back home and using the benefits of his broadened education and experience for the benefit of his fellow Anguillians.  However, it is presently the law.  Until the Constitution is changed, any Anguillian who has taken out a second citizenship, where the evidence is that that foreign naturalisation amounts to acknowledging allegiance, obedience, or adherence to that foreign power or state, must validly renounce that second citizenship prior to nomination day to be qualified to be nominated as a candidate to run in general elections in Anguilla.  If he or she fails to successfully renounce the foreign citizenship prior to nomination day, an expert witness in the foreign law is likely to testify at any subsequent trial that he or she was disqualified at the time of nomination under this section of the Constitution.
Note that the Anguillian who was born in a foreign country, and has acquired a second citizenship as a result of birth, is not disqualified.  An example of such an Anguillian would be the child of an Anguillian father and mother who have emigrated to the USA, and who have had their children born there as US citizens.  Such parents may continue to be British citizens under British law, and their children may continue to be entitled to British citizenship and Anguillian belongership.  As a result of this provision, the late Mr Jeremiah Gumbs, who had emigrated to the USA, and had been granted US citizenship in the early stages of the Second World War as a result of his enlisting in the armed forces of the United States, was considered disqualified from running in general elections in Anguilla.  But, his son Alan Gumbs, who was born and brought up in the USA, and was a US citizen by birth, was considered fully qualified some years ago to run as a candidate for election to the House of Assembly of Anguilla when he opted to return to live in his father's home island of Anguilla.
The second disqualification is for Ministers of Religion.  A minister of religion is defined by the law as one in holy orders or any other person the functions of whose principal occupation include teaching or preaching in any congregation for religious worship.  The expression 'holy orders', as I understand it, applies to Anglican and Roman Catholic priests.  Baptist and Pentecostalist ministers are caught by the second arm of the section.  So, Pastor Ambrose Gumbs of Blowing Point is as disqualified from running in elections as is Bishop Brooks of the Anglican Church.  But, a retired minister of religion such as Dr Clifton Niles is, in my opinion, not disqualified.
The third disqualification applies to persons holding an office of emolument under the Crown.  That is just a fancy expression to cover civil servants, or public servants who receive a salary from the government.  If a public servant wants to run in elections, he or she must first resign from the service.  And, there is no guarantee that he or she will be allowed back into the service if the elections are lost. 
The other disqualifications apply to bankrupt persons, persons of unsound mind, persons under sentence of death or imprisonment; and persons who have been convicted of election offences.
Since the passage into law by the Anguilla House of Assembly of the Elections (Amendment) Act, 2014, the procedural requirements for nomination under the Elections Act have become more significant.
Previous to the coming into effect of the Amendment Act on 31 October 2014, the provisions for nomination were governed by section 29 of the Elections Act.  This provides for the Nomination Papers to be supplied by the Returning Officer in Form 5.  Candidate must be nominated by at least 2 registered voters in the Electoral District.  The candidate has to sign, consenting to be nominated.  And, on the form, the nominators had to certify that to the best of their belief the candidate was qualified for election as a member of the House of Assembly.  There was no requirement for the candidate to certify that he was in fact qualified to be nominated.  Form 5 has now been replaced.  The most significant change in the new form is that the nominee must now declare that he or she meets the requirements of section 36 of the Constitution, and is qualified to be elected as a member, and is not disqualified from being elected as a member.
A new section 76A creates the offence.
False Declaration
76A Every person who knowingly or negligently makes a declaration as to their qualification to be elected as a member of the House of Assembly pursuant to sections 36 and 37 of the Anguilla Constitution Order 1982 and that declaration is false, is guilty of making a false declaration within the meaning of this Act.”
This new section says that every person who knowingly or negligently makes a false declaration as to their qualification to be elected as a member of the House of Assembly is guilty of the offence of making a false declaration. 
In my view, this is one of the most important reforms in recent history to Anguilla’s elections law.  Before section 76A was introduced, if a voter in Anguilla believed that a candidate was not qualified to be elected, eg, by having taken out a foreign nationality and swearing allegiance to a foreign power, the only way that candidate could be challenged was if he won the election.  Then, the losing candidate could bring an Election Petition before a High Court Judge against the disqualified winning candidate.  The petition had to be filed within 21 days or it would be dismissed.  This petition procedure is very expensive and cumbersome.  It is almost impossible in a short period of time to gather proof that another person is naturalised in a foreign state.  Candidates for elections don’t normally wave their second passport about for all to see.  On the contrary, they keep it very quiet and secret, for obvious reasons.
What this amendment does is to create a new offence which can be prosecuted by the police.  The police have much greater resources for investigating and bringing a case than any citizen, whether a political candidate or not, can possibly have.  Also, the police are not limited by the 21 day deadline for bringing an election petition.
Unfortunately, the section does not make the offence triable summarily before the Magistrate, like most of the other election offences, but requires the offence to be tried in the High Court before a judge and jury.  That is a very expensive and cumbersome process in comparison to a trial before the Magistrate.  The police are unlikely to happy about using up their resources and energy in prosecuting such offences, unless there is evidence of a blatant breach of the law.  However, it is noteworthy that the offence can be committed not only by a winning candidate but also by a losing one.
A losing candidate who has evidence that a winning candidate was disqualified under the Constitution from being nominated or elected to the House of Assembly still always has the option of filing the traditional election petition before the High Court for the judge to declare the seat vacated.  This, as I have said, is an expensive and difficult option, and he has only 21 days to file his petition.  With the new offence having been introduced in 2014, it is more likely that in future persons who have the evidence will take it to the police and request an investigation and prosecution.  It is highly unlikely, in my view, that a losing candidate who has the evidence that another candidate was disqualified under the Constitution will in future bring an election petition to vacate the seat.  It is much more likely that he or she will take the evidence to the police and request an investigation and prosecution.  However, there always remains the possibility that the police will decline to investigate and prosecute a candidate where there is evidence that he or she was a naturalised foreign citizen.  Once the police are backed up by the Attorney-General in declining to prosecute, there is nothing a citizen can do to demand that they prosecute someone they have decided not to prosecute.
Note, however, that this offence can be prosecuted whether or not the candidate has won the seat.  If any person has the evidence that any candidate in the election was disqualified under the Constitution, by any of grounds we have looked at above, from voting, he or she can bring the evidence to the police and file a complaint.  The police can then bring the prosecution.
The penalties for a conviction under this section are provided by a new section 78A, and the old section 79 as amended.
Penalty for False Declaration
78A   “Every person who is guilty of false declaration, is liable, on conviction, to imprisonment for 2 years”.
Section 78A says that every person who is guilty of a false declaration is liable on conviction to imprisonment for 2 years. 
It is because new section 78A does not use the words “is liable on summary conviction” to imprisonment for 2 years, as in the other offence sections of the Elections Act, that we can say that the section requires the offence to be tried indictably, before a judge and jury.
The old section 79 as now amended provides a further penalty for the offence of making a false declaration.
Disqualification for bribery, etc
79.    “Every person who is convicted of bribery . . . or false declaration . . . shall, in addition to any other punishment, be disqualified during a period of 7 years from the date of conviction from being –
(a) registered as a voter or voting at any election; and
(b) elected or appointed a member of the Assembly or, if elected or appointed before his conviction, of retaining his seat as such a member.”
Section 79 provides that every person who is convicted of making a false declaration shall, in addition to any other punishment, be disqualified during a period of 7 years from being either registered as a voter, or voting in any election, or being elected or appointed a member of the Assembly.  If the disqualified candidate has been elected or appointed to the House, that candidate must give up his or her seat in the House.
So, there are several reasons why these amendments to the Elections Act should be considered a major improvement over the old law.  Previously, it was not a criminal offence for a disqualified candidate to offer himself or herself for nomination.  There was no downside for a disqualified person running as a candidate in an election, unless he happened to win.  Then, only if he or she won, the elected member faced the possibility that his losing opponent might have the evidence of his disqualification and bring an election petition to unseat him.  His seat might be ordered vacated, but he did not face any jail time.  He would have gained a little time, and if his renunciation of his foreign citizenship came through before the by-election was called, he could run as a candidate again, and hope to win again. 
Under the previous law, if the disqualified candidate did not win, there was no proceeding, either civil or criminal, that could be brought against him.  Now, whether he wins or loses, if he swears out a false declaration, he faces the possibility that the police authorities may take up the case, and investigate his foreign citizenship using all the formidable resources at their disposal, and bring criminal proceedings against him.  Now, whether he wins or loses the election, he faces not only being disqualified from running again for another 7 years, but also of paying a fine or facing imprisonment for up to 2 years.  I hope you will agree that this is a pretty significant reason why candidates who know they are disqualified will in future ask their followers and supporters to refrain from nominating them to run in elections in Anguilla.
One last caution about this amendment.  There is always the possibility that the police may, for whatever reason, refuse to proceed against a candidate for making a false declaration.  They may, for example, consider they do not have sufficient evidence of the commission of the offence.  In such a case, it may be wise for a candidate who lost to a person he knows to be disqualified to bring an election petition even while filing a complaint with the police.  Expensive though it is, and constrained as it is by a tight timetable, by proving before the judge that the winning candidate made a false declaration when he or she was nominated, the police will have the evidence they need to bring criminal proceedings against the disqualified candidate.

Elections - 6. Voting

Today we are going to look at the law and procedure relating to voting.  This is the procedure by which we attend at a Polling Station on Election Day and select our candidate for membership in the House of Assembly.  That is the role we play in selecting a new Government.  After we have voted, the Constitution provides for the elected members of the Assembly to inform the Governor who they wish to be the new Chief Minister.  The Chief Minister is sworn in to office, and he then informs the Governor who he wants to be his or her Ministers.  The Governor then swears in the Ministers selected by the Chief Minister.
The law on voting is found in two places, the Constitution, and the Elections Act.  The relevant provisions of the Constitution are sections 43 and 44.  Section 43 is straightforward.  It is titled “Qualification of voters”, and it reads:
Qualification of voters
43. (1) Subject to the next following subsection a person shall be qualified to be registered as a voter in an electoral district if he is of the age of eighteen years and upwards and—
(a) is a British Dependent Territories citizen born in Anguilla, and is domiciled there at the qualifying date; or
(b)     (i) is a person who belongs to Anguilla who has resided in Anguilla for a period of not less than twelve months immediately before the qualifying date, and is domiciled there at that date, and is the lawful spouse, widow or widower, or the son or daughter or the spouse of such son or daughter of a person who was born in Anguilla; or
(ii) is a person who belongs to Anguilla who is domiciled in Anguilla and has resided there for a period of at least five years immediately before the qualifying date; and
(c) is at the qualifying date resident in the electoral district in which he claims to be registered.
      (2) Every person who is qualified to be registered as a voter in any electoral district shall be entitled to be so registered provided that a person shall not be registered as a voter in more than one electoral district.
You will notice that there are 4 qualifications for a person to be capable of voting in Anguilla.  First, he or she must be a belonger of Anguilla. Second, the voter must be aged 18 or upwards.  Third, if the voter was not born in Anguilla, but is married to an Anguillian or is the child or spouse of a child of an Anguillian, he or she must have resided in Anguilla for not less than 12 months immediately before the relevant date and be domiciled here at that date.  If, on the other hand, he or she is a belonger, but is not married to or the child of an Anguillian, then he or she must be domiciled in Anguilla and have resided here for at least 5 years before the relevant date.
Fourth, the voter must be resident in the Electoral District in which he or she claims to be registered.  We can only be registered in one District.  I deal in greater detail with the requirement for residence in the first talk I gave on this topic.  However, it is so important it bore repetition.
The second section of the Constitution which governs who can be a voter in Anguilla is section 44.  This reads:
Disqualification of voters
44. (1) No person shall be qualified to be registered as a voter who—
(a) is under sentence of death . . .or is under a sentence of imprisonment . . . exceeding twelve months . . .;
(b) is a person certified to be insane or otherwise adjudged to be of unsound mind under any law in force in Anguilla; or
(c) is disqualified for registration as a voter by any law in force in Anguilla relating to offences connected with elections . . .
These are what are called the disqualification of voters provisions.  The first one is if we are under a sentence of death.  The second is if we are insane.  The third is if we have been convicted of an election offence that carries the penalty of disqualification to vote.
Since the passage into law by the Anguilla House of Assembly of the Elections (Amendment) Act, 2014, the procedural requirements for voting under the Elections Act have become more significant.
Previous to the coming into effect of the Amendment Act on 31 October 2014, the provisions for voting were governed by Part 4 of the Elections Act.  This consists of sections 26 to 62 of the Act, and they are too long to put up as a slide.  Basically, we turn up to the Polling Station in our District on election day, and take our place in the line.  We enter the polling station and declare our name, residence and occupation, making sure we accurately repeat the information on the Voters List, so there is no confusion about who we are.  New section 49A authorises the presiding officer to check our fingers for electoral ink before we are given a ballot and allowed to vote.
Ballot paper not to be given to voter unless no marks of electoral ink appear on voter
49A (1) Subject to the provisions of section 49D, every presiding officer shall refuse to give any ballot paper to any voter unless he is satisfied that there does not appear –
(a) Upon the appropriate digit of that voter; or
(b) In the case of a voter who the presiding officer is satisfied is suffering from an injury to the appropriate digit, upon any other digits of that voter;
any mark of electoral ink.
It is clear from this new section 49A that the presiding officer will not give us a ballot unless he or she is satisfied that we do not have any electoral ink on our finger.
After we have been issued with our ballot, we enter the polling booth and mark our “X” against the name of our preferred candidate.  We then return to the presiding officer and deliver our folded ballot to the presiding officer who removes the counterfoil.
At that point the presiding officer used previously to return the ballot to us so we could deposit it in the ballot box. 
Now, new section 49B provides that, upon receiving our marked ballot, and before removing the counterfoil, the presiding officer must ensure that we dip our finger in the electoral ink provided.
(3)  If any voter on being required to immerse his appropriate digit or any other digit as required under subsection (1) in the electoral ink fails or refuses to immerse his digit, the presiding officer shall immediately destroy the ballot paper handed to him by that voter in the presence of the poll clerk and of the agents of the candidates and shall make an entry in the poll book setting out the particulars in relation to the destruction of the ballot paper.
If we refuse to dip our finger in the ink, the presiding officer is required to destroy the ballot, and to make an entry in the poll book setting out the particulars.
Electoral ink is internationally recognised as a good security feature to prevent double voting in elections.  The ink normally contains silver nitrate, which stains the skin on exposure to ultraviolet light, leaving a mark that is almost impossible to wash off quickly and is only removed as external skin cells are replaced.  It usually also contains a biocide to ensure bacteria are not transferred from voter to voter. 
Previously, voters and candidates who realised that fraudulent registration of voters was going on with the intention of having party supporters vote in more than one constituency, had to go through the expensive, time consuming, and inconvenient process of filing an objection.  These objections can still be made, and they have to be heard by the Magistrate.  The process invariably causes ill feelings in the community, and many politicians prefer to keep silent, and not make an objection, for fear of offending whole families, some of whom might otherwise have voted in his or her favour.  The strategy used to counter this illegal practice, appears to have been to try to get as many of your own party supporters to illegally register in as many other constituencies as possible.
Now, there will be an independent, fair, and transparent method of ensuring that double voting cannot take place in the future.  It is inexpensive and easy to administer.  It does not require any complicated computer systems or technical expertise to make it work. So, in future, however many constituencies I am registered in, I will only be able to vote in one.  I am sure we will all agree that this is one of the most admirable and important electoral reforms in recent history in Anguilla.

Saturday, September 13, 2014

Election Related Litigation

ELECTION-RELATED LITIGATION IN THE EASTERN CARIBBEAN SUPREME COURT:[1] WITHSTANDING INTERLOCUTORY STRIKE-OUT APPLICATIONS[2]
By Don Mitchell CBE QC
[1]     The process for presenting an election petition in the Eastern Caribbean Supreme Court [3]is a highly technical and legally complex area of law, known well by only a few specialists.  The rules for presentation and service of the petition are neither transparent nor easily understandable.  The requirements are onerous.  Compliance requires considerable time, effort, and expense.  The arcane language used may not be accurately understood by the layman.  It seems that every effort has been made to block a petitioner’s attempts to understand what he or she must do.  All but the most determined and well-resourced petitioners are likely to be deterred by the procedure.[4]  With general elections due to be held in Anguilla no later than April 2015, this topic is most appropriate to be raised at this time.
[2]     To understand the legal background to the procedure for contesting the result of an election in our region, we start with our Constitutions.  These provide that election petitions are heard by the High Court.  So, for example, section 41(2) of the Anguilla Constitution baldly states:
Any question whether a person has been validly elected as a member of the Assembly . . . shall be determined by the High Court, whose decision shall be final and not subject to any appeal.”
[3]     The right to present an election petition is further constrained by the statutory provisions.  So, section 64(1)(a) of the Anguilla Elections Act states that
“Except as provided in paragraph (b), the petition shall be presented within 21 days after the return made by the Returning Officer of the member to whose election the petition relates.”
Failure to file and serve the petition within the statutory period of 21 days is fatal.  The period of 21 days is an improvement over the more traditional period of 7 days still provided by the legislation in some other countries.
[4]     There is usually no hint in our elections legislation as to what the grounds of an election petition might be.  One possible ground is mentioned in section 64(1)(b) of the Anguilla Act which, however, merely states that
if a petition questions the return or election upon an allegation of corrupt practices, and specifically alleges a payment of money or other reward to have been made by any member, or to his account, or with his privity, since the time of the return in pursuance or in furtherance of such corrupt practices, the petition may be presented within 28 days after the date of the payment or other reward.”
This section only extends the period of time for filing and serving an election petition to 28 days where corrupt practices are alleged.  This extension of time is, no doubt, as in the UK, in recognition of the inevitable difficulty faced by a petitioner in collecting evidence of corrupt practices.
[5]     Where the elections legislation sets out the basis for declaring an election void by listing the offences on conviction whereof a candidate incurs the penalty of disqualification for membership of the House and the avoidance of his election, then it is important to be certain that the offence alleged in the petition to have been committed by the candidate is one of the listed offences, and that he has been prosecuted and convicted of the offence.[5]
[6]     Our Constitutions, elections statutes and the applicable case law require an election petition to be presented within a specified timeframe, in a particular manner, and to provide specific information.  At the conclusion of the trial the judge must determine whether the person elected was in fact duly elected or whether the election is void.  The court has power to declare some other person elected.
[7]     Forty years ago, when I was a young lawyer beginning my practice of law, elections results were challenged on few and simple grounds.  There were no locally-made rules relating to election petitions.  We followed then, as many of us still do, the UK Election Petition Rules, 1960 (the UK Rules).[6]  The applicable common law principles were set out in Halsbury.[7]  Petitions, and the applications to strike them out, typically followed the precedents and the procedure explained in the established textbooks:  Atkins Court Forms, Rogers on Elections;[8] Parker on The Law and Practice of Election Petitions;[9]  and Schofield’s Election Law.[10]  If your law library was lacking, then you were likely to be lost at sea when it came to assisting a disappointed candidate.
[8]     The grounds for bringing an election petition in our jurisdiction are not clearly defined in the legislation.  Taking into account our Constitutions and election statutes, the most usual grounds for challenging an election were, and are, that:
(a)     the ballot was cast using a pen instead of the official pencil, or a tick was made instead of a cross,[11] or
(b)     an error was made by an election official that affected the result, or at least meant the election was not conducted so as to be substantially in accordance with the rules;[12] or
(c)     a candidate or his or her agent committed corrupt or illegal practices which so extensively prevailed in an election that they might reasonably be supposed to have affected the result;[13] or that
(d)     the successful candidate was disqualified under the Constitutional provisions.[14]
[9]     Then as now, an election petition might not be unilaterally withdrawn by the petitioner, but only as permitted by the judge.  The theory is that the presentation of an election petition is not the commencement of a private lawsuit, but the initial step in a quasi-criminal proceeding.[15]  The public in general, and the constituency in particular, have an interest in it.  That is why it cannot be abandoned at the mere will of a petitioner without the leave of the court. 
[10]   Where there are no local rules, recourse is had to the UK Rules.  We were reminded that these UK Rules apply to us by the 1979 St Kitts decision of Sir Maurice Davis CJ in the Court of Appeal in Anthony Ribeiro’s appeal.  In that case, in the court below, Cecil Hewlett J had personally carried out a recount in open court of all of the ballots cast in a by-election which, on election-day had returned Mr Ribeiro as the winner by 13 votes.  But, there were 99 rejected ballots.  Dr Simmonds argued that the majority had been cast for him.  The judge carried out his own recount, the result of which was that he certified[16] Dr Simmonds as having been returned for the seat with a majority of 22 votes.  There were at the time no locally-made election petition rules in St Kitts.  He took the view that he could dispose of the matter by following our rules of court without reference to the UK Rules.  On appeal, Sir Maurice held[17] that the reception of law provisions of the then applicable Courts Act[18] applied the UK Rules to St Kitts.  He found that, despite the fact that the judge did not observe certain technicalities in the recounting, being satisfied of the fairness and accuracy of the judge’s count, the wish of the people expressed through the ballot box should prevail.  He dismissed the appeal.
[11]   Sir Vincent Floissac CJ came to the same conclusion on the applicability of the UK Rules in relation to Saint Vincent and the Grenadines in his 1997 decision in the Michael Browne appeal.  He held[19] that Rule 9(4) was a mandatory statutory provision, and failure to serve notice of the nature of the security within the time prescribed paralysed the petition.  Charmaine Pemberton J did the same in relation to Grenada in her 2004 judgment[20] in the High Court in the George Prime case.
[12]   The applicability of the UK Rules has not always been without controversy.  So, in Lindsay Grant’s 2004 petition against the return of Rupert Herbert in the general elections in St Kitts, the respondent filed an interlocutory application to dismiss the petition on the ground that the court’s jurisdiction to hear election petitions could not be exercised in the absence of special rules.  Neither counsel appears to have apprised Davidson Baptiste J[21] of Sir Maurice’s decision in the Ribeiro case that the UK Rules apply.  If they had, Baptiste J may well have dismissed Rupert Herbert’s application on the basis that there were election petition rules, ie, the UK Rules.  Instead, he dismissed[22] the application on the general principle that the court must have jurisdiction to hear election petitions.  He struck out some of the allegations in the petition, but he ordered the matter to proceed to trial.  It seems that there should no longer be any doubt that, in the absence of local election petition rules, and given the reception of law provisions of our current Supreme Court Acts, the UK Rules apply to us, and our courts are required to follow the principles and procedure provided for by those Rules and the learning that derives from the cases that interpret them.
[13]   The UK Rules apply when there is no local provision for the procedure to be followed in election petitions.  It is not necessary for the Chief Justice to make the rules that the election statute permits to be made.  There may well be rules incorporated in the statute.  If only some of the election petition rules are included in a local election statute, it cannot be said to be without local rules.  So, Anguilla has recently inserted into its Elections Act[23] some of the basic rules to be followed in presenting an election petition.  These provisions may be considered to be grossly inadequate, but their insertion into the Act has introduced a local code to govern electoral petitions in Anguilla, subject to any further rules that may be made under the Act.  The result is that in Anguilla the fuller UK Rules can probably no longer be applied.  
[14]   Most of our election statutes provide for election petition rules to be made by the Chief Justice.  In this connection, the Anguilla Elections Act contains an unusually enlightened provision which is not duplicated to my knowledge in any other jurisdiction.  Section 64(2) provides that the local High Court Judge may make further election petition rules.  It states:
Rules, not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act as to the deposit of security and the practice and procedure for the service and hearing of election petitions and matters incidental thereto may be made by a Judge.”
However, no High Court Judge has ever made any election petition rules for Anguilla.
[15]   The statutory provisions and the rules provide little guidance to a potential petitioner trying to establish whether his or her complaint is a valid ground on which to challenge an election.  Section 65 of the Anguilla Elections Act provides for the election of a candidate, certified by the Judge as personally guilty or guilty by his agents of any corruption or illegal practice, to be void.  Section 66 provides further for a candidate’s election to be void, and for him to be disqualified from standing in the subsequent by-election, if it is shown on the election petition that corrupt or illegal practices or illegal payments or employments committed in reference to the election for the purpose of promoting or procuring the election have so extensively prevailed that they may reasonably be supposed to have affected the result.  The terms ‘corruption’ and ‘illegal practice’ are not defined, so that one must have reference to the case law to understand their meaning. 
[16]   The formalities set out in our election statutes and the UK Rules applying to an election petition are onerous.[24]  So, a petition might be required to be served within 5 days of its filing.  The court has no discretion or power to extend the time for service, regardless of the circumstances.  If it is not served within the required time, the court will hold[25] that it has no jurisdiction to entertain the petition.  The requirement that a petition be presented within a particular time is substantive, not procedural, and the time cannot be enlarged in the courts discretion.  Similarly, if the petitioner fails to serve the required notice on the respondent of the amount and nature of the security, but instead, for example, serves a copy of the application notice relating to the security, the court has no power or discretion to cure the irregularity and extend time for compliance.
APPEALS FROM THE REGISTRATION PROCESS
[17]   Legal challenges that affect election results begin even before the election takes place.  Decisions of a Registration Officer during the process of the revision of the voters' lists are usually appealable to the High Court.  So, in the 1999 appeal to the High Court from a decision of the Registration Officer by Terence Henry in St Kitts, Neville Smith J dismissed the appeal when he ruled[26] that the Registration Officer was not obliged to automatically remove the names of persons objected to and who did not appear before him.  Later the same year, the Court of Appeal dismissed Terence Henry’s appeal against Smith J’s decision.  The Court confirmed[27] that any person aggrieved by a decision of the Registration Officer, on the hearing of claims for and objections to the registration of voters, has a right of appeal to the High Court.
[18]   In the Laureen James appeal to the High Court against the decision of the Registration Officer not to remove names from the Voters’ List, Francis Belle J, in a 6-page 2007 judgment,[28] followed the decision of Smith J in the Terence Henry case.  He found that the Registration Officer was not obliged to remove the names of persons who did not appear before him from the List.  He ordered the Registration Officer to rehear the objections, taking care to hear the evidence, and to make a Record of it, and to produce the Record if there was an appeal to the High Court.  In a later Laureen James case, she appealed again against a decision of the Registration Officer.  Errol Thomas J, in an 11-page 2013 judgment,[29] found that the elections statute required Notice of Appeal to be given to the Registration Officer within 7 days of his decision.  Notification after 13 days rendered the appeal null and void, and he dismissed her appeal.
[19]   Kenrick Radix’s case from Grenada is authority for the rule that complaints against the registration process may not normally be brought in an election petition.  In that case, the Electoral List had not been revised annually as required by the House of Representatives Act.  The losing candidate, Kenrick Radix, complained by way of an election petition that several persons who were entitled to be registered to vote were precluded from doing so, while others whose names had appeared on an earlier list were improperly omitted, so that the election was contrary to the Constitution and null and void.  The trial judge dismissed his petition.  On appeal, Sir Maurice Davis CJ held[30] that the election of a candidate can be avoided only upon proof of an election offence committed by the candidate or upon proof of some irregularity during the conduct of the election which affected the results, or that the election was conducted so badly that it was not substantially in accordance with the law on elections.  The validity of the List was a separate question, and the time to raise that issue was some time before it was proclaimed by the Governor General.  Once it was proclaimed it became conclusive as to the persons who were entitled to vote at the next election or by-election as the case may be, and he dismissed the appeal against the decision of the trial judge.
[20]   In the nine appeals to the High Court by Cherita Clarke against decisions made by the Registration Officer in objections against the inclusion of various persons in the List of Voters, Darshan Ramdhani J [AG] was left somewhat bemused at the casual and indifferent way in which the objections were dealt with.  In a 20-page judgment[31] he attempted to set out for the election officer’s information and guidance some of the basic and elementary steps that he needed to take if his hearing of an objection was to be a fair one.  He was required to give notice of the objections to the persons objected to, and he should consider all the evidence, and at the end state clearly the reasons for his decisions.  He remitted eight of the matters to the Registration Officer with directions to properly rehear them and in the event of any appeal to give reasons for his decisions.
INTERLOCUTORY APPLICATIONS
[21]   In an earlier period, once the election petition was presented, its hearing was swift and there were few opportunities to file an interlocutory application.  Procedural questions were generally raised and decided during the trial before the judge.  Some interlocutory applications could be dealt with at an earlier stage, such as applications questioning the sufficiency of the security.  But, then as now, the amount of the security was so low that petitioners preferred to pay the amount into court rather than bring sureties to sign a recognizance.  Applications might also be brought by a respondent for particulars of an election offence that was pleaded generally in the petition to be given by the petitioner.  If the particulars were not given within the time ordered, the petition was liable to be dismissed.
[22]   Obtaining an interlocutory order in your client’s favour is a vital, usually conclusive, strategic step in election petition proceedings.  The constitutional and statutory provisions invariably prohibit an appeal against an interlocutory order.  This point has been repeatedly made by the Court of Appeal.  See for example the judgments in William Williams’ 1975 appeal from St Lucia.  Bruno J refused[32] an application by the petitioner for an enlargement of time to furnish particulars in an election petition.  The petitioner applied for leave to appeal the order.  On an in limine objection that the court had no jurisdiction to entertain an appeal in an interlocutory proceeding in an election petition, Sir Maurice Davis CJ found[33] that the Constitution prohibited any appeal from a decision of the High Court other than a final decision.  Williams filed another application for a scrutiny of all the ballots cast and a declaration that he was the duly elected candidate.  The High Court Judge refused to conduct a scrutiny on the basis that he was satisfied with the conduct of the election officers.  On appeal, Elwyn St Bernard JA held[34] that scrutiny is not an automatic exercise in every election petition, and the appeal was dismissed.  See also Brian Alleyne CJ [AG]’s 2006 judgment[35] in the Eugene Hamilton appeals from St Kitts.  He dismissed them on the basis that no appeal lay from an interlocutory decision in the High Court in an election petition.  It is noteworthy that this objection was also successfully made in limine on the hearing of the appeal.  Another example of how the Court of Appeal treats an attempted appeal from an interlocutory order is found in Michael Gordon JA’s 2008 judgment[36] in the A-G of Grenada’s appeal from Grenada.  As Gordon JA pointed out, the Constitution of Grenada permits appeals to the Court of Appeal from a final order of a judge in an election petition, but not from a decision made on an interlocutory application.  We have seen above that in Anguilla no appeal is possible even against a final order made in an election petition.[37]
[23]   In the 1970s and 1980s, interlocutory applications to set aside the proceedings usually dealt with allegations of failure by the petitioner to meet the formal requirements of either the Constitution or the Election Act.  These objections are still relevant today and might include:
(a)     That the petitioner was not the candidate or a qualified voter or otherwise qualified to bring the petition;[38]
(b)     That the petition was presented outside of the time limited by the Act;[39]
(c)     That security for costs was not given within the time limited;[40]
(d)     That notice of the security for costs was not served in time;[41]
(e)     That the petition was not signed by the petitioner;
(f)      That the petition contained impermissible evidence;
(g)     That all the necessary respondents had not been joined as parties;[42]
(h)     That two or more elected candidates have been wrongly joined in one petition;[43]
(i)      That the petition had not been served on the appropriate respondents within the prescribed time;[44]
(j)      That ordered particulars have not been delivered in the time ordered.[45]
Within the last 20 years, interlocutory applications have become more sophisticated, including relying on constitutional objections.  However, the traditional grounds of objection still continue to be made in the courts of the ECSC.
[24]   Failure to follow the deadlines in elections laws can be fatal on an interlocutory application to dismiss.  In the 1967 Stevens petition from Nevis, the petitioner forgot to insert a prayer for relief.  He applied to the High Court to amend the petition to add a prayer, but it was after the time limit for presentation had elapsed.  Edgar Heyliger J held that there was no valid petition before him, and to permit the amendment would be to permit a petition to be presented outside the time specified.  Additionally, the bond failed to comply with the requirements of the Constitution.  He dismissed the petition.  On appeal, Elwyn St Bernard JA delivered judgment[46] upholding Heyliger J’s judgment.  He held that the requirement that a petition be presented within a particular time was substantive, not procedural, and the time could not be enlarged in the court’s discretion, making a petition presented out of time liable to be struck out.  The amendment sought by adding a prayer was an amendment to cure a defect in the document which did not contain any allegation that by reason of one or more acts or practices the election of the candidate was void.  Finally, he held that the provisions relating to security for costs are peremptory and impose conditions which must be complied with before a petition can be considered to be properly presented to the court.  He dismissed the appeal.
[25]   The statutory requirements for service of the petition and of the notice of security for costs are generally stringent.  A petition may be dismissed on an interlocutory application if there is any defect in the giving or serving of the Recognizance for Security for Costs.  Satrohan Singh J[47] so ruled[48] in St John Payne’s 1984 petition from St Kitts.
[26]   In Shemilita Joseph’s 1999 petition out of Antigua, Kenneth Benjamin J[49] was faced with an application by the respondent to strike out the election petition on the grounds, inter alia, that the petitioner had failed to serve a copy of it on Sherwin Bowen, who had been returned to the seat.  In his ruling[50] he did not strike out the petition, but instead struck Mr Bowen from the proceedings, struck certain paragraphs from the petition, and continued the proceedings against the Returning Officer.
[27]   In Ethlyn Smith’s 2003 election petition in the British Virgin Islands, Hugh Rawlins J[51] had to deal with an interlocutory application to strike out.  There were several complaints against the validity of her petition.  These included that (i) she was out of time for entering security for costs;  (ii) failure to join the Returning Officer;  (iii) wrongful joinder of the Supervisor of Elections in her official capacity;  (iv) failure to provide the prescribed security; (v) wrongful joinder of two elected members in the same petition;  (vi) failure to disclose any cause of action against anyone, the petitioner complaining that she received votes marked with a tick instead of a cross.  The petitioner filed an application to amend.  Rawlins J accepted the respondent’s application, ruling[52] that you cannot go to CPR 2000 to deal with misjoinder or non-joinder of parties;  that you cannot amend an election petition to join parties out of time;  and that the election statutes are to be interpreted stringently, and failure to comply with their requirements is fatal to the petition unless the court can find that the failure goes only to form.  He dismissed the petition.
[28]   In the Grenadian case of George Prime, Charmaine Pemberton J in a 22-page 2004 ruling[53] dealt with the respondent’s interlocutory application to strike out the election petition.  The grounds were (i) that security was not provided as required by the Representation of the People Act;  (ii) for non-compliance with the applicable UK Election Petition Rules, 1960;  and (iii) on the ground that it was not competent for an election petition to raise matters other than concerning the conduct of the polls on polling day.  She held that the UK Rules applied in Grenada.  She also held that where the Act allows for late registration of voters, as in Grenada, decisions taken by the Returning Officer are final, and may not, in the absence of bad faith, be inquired into on an election petition.  She found that payment of the required security by way of a cheque (not cashed by the Registrar until after the prescribed deadline) was not compliance with the Act.  Finally, she found that the petitioner had not within the 5-day limit served the respondents with the petition and a copy of any affidavit accompanying the recognizance, and she granted the application and dismissed the petition.
[29]   In Daven Joseph’s case from Antigua, Louise Blenman J,[54] in a 25-page 2009 High Court ruling,[55] upheld an application to dismiss two petitions for failure to file them within the statutory period of 7 days and to serve them within 5 days thereafter.  She ruled that CPR 2000 did not apply to election petitions as CPR 2000 did not comfortably co-exist with the provisions of the Representation of the People Act.  She also ruled that failure to serve the petitions within the stipulated 5-day period was fatal, and she granted the application and struck out the petitions.
[30]   The corrupt practice of election bribery as a criminal offence has always been subject to its own special rules of drafting, not found in the old RSC 1970, which dealt only with civil proceedings.  The current leading practitioners’ textbooks on drafting election petitions cite an authority as ancient as 1865 to indicate that it is enough to allege generally in an election petition that “The respondent, by himself and other persons on his behalf, was guilty of bribery, treating, and undue influence, before, during and after the election.”[56]  It has always been for the respondent to apply for particulars of the names of the other persons, of the dates of each of the alleged acts of bribery and treating, the names of the persons bribing, and of the persons bribed and treated, of the times and nature of the alleged acts of treating, etc.  In Beal v Smith, the election judge in chambers ordered the petitioners to file and serve particulars in writing three days before the day appointed for the trial.  On appeal, the Court of Appeal refused to interfere with this exercise of his discretion.  Modern editions of Atkins Court Forms cite[57] this early case as authority for a generalized pleading of fraud in an election petition.  Similarly, Halsbury[58] states that it is sufficient for an election petition to allege the grounds generally, and a petition alleging that the respondent is charged with bribery, corruption, and undue influence, and also with illegal practices, would in form be sufficient.  This is the procedure in the UK even today under the 1960 UK Rules.
[31]   In recent years, our courts have begun to diverge from this procedure.  So, in Lindsay Grant’s 2004 election petition from St Kitts he alleged electoral fraud on the part of the respondents.  They filed interlocutory applications, either to dismiss the petitions on the basis that they were bad for want of particulars of fraud and of material facts, or for the relevant paragraphs to be struck out.  Davidson Baptiste J in three separate rulings[59] on 27 July 2005 granted the applications and, though he did not dismiss the petitions for want of particulars, he struck out the relevant paragraphs.  He does not appear to have had the assistance of counsel on the correct procedure under the UK Rules to be followed where particulars of an allegation of electoral fraud are omitted from the election petition.  He was persuaded to follow J Hewlett’s High Court decision in Simmonds v Ribeiro, without having his attention drawn to the fact that this decision was overruled in the Court of Appeal by Sir Maurice in Ribeiro v Simmonds.[60]  Eugene Hamilton’s appeal[61] to the Court of Appeal failed on the procedural ground that the court had no jurisdiction to entertain interlocutory appeals in election petitions.  The Court was not able to get to the issue of the procedure recommended in Beal v Smith.[62]
[32]   Three months later in Dominica, in Ferdinand Frampton’s 2005 election petition alleging bribery, corruption and undue influence, Hugh Rawlins J on an interlocutory application to strike it out, and a counter application to amend it, described[63] the time limits set in the election legislation as “conditions precedent, mandatory, and peremptory” which must be strictly followed.  He also ruled that CPR 2000 did not apply to an election petition except to the extent the rules so provide, and in this case the rules did not permit it.  He held that the petitions alleging corruption had not, within the time limited, been ‘perfected’ by giving detailed particulars of the alleged corruption.  He did not accept that in Dominica it was sufficient in an election petition to allege the grounds of corruption generally, i.e., that the respondent and his agents were charged with bribery, corruption, and undue influence, and also with illegal practices, and he dismissed the five petitions.  In arriving at this decision, Rawlins J recognised that in the UK it is sufficient in an election petition to allege the grounds generally that a respondent and his agents are charged with bribery, corruption, undue influence, and with illegal practices, leaving it for the respondent to apply for particulars.  Yet, he was persuaded that an election petition must be ‘perfected’ within the time stipulated.  He relied on dicta by Dennis Byron CJ [AG][64] in the 1997 BVI case of Thomas v Stoutt to find that the petitioner should have given full particulars of the alleged election fraud.[65]  That case was a land dispute in the British Virgin Islands.  The 1970 Rules of the Supreme Court (RSC) applied to land disputes.  Byron CJ held that under the rules an allegation of fraud pleaded in general terms will not suffice.  Instead, it is necessary for particulars of fraud such as definite facts on specific conduct to be pleaded.  But, a land dispute is a civil trial, to which the civil procedure rules applied then as now.  It is not clear to me how Rawlins J came to be persuaded to apply that rule of procedure to an election petition case.
[33]   Ferdinand Frampton appealed to the Court of Appeal against Rawlins J’s ruling.  Denys Barrow JA, sitting as a single judge of the Court, determined the issues on written submissions in a 10-page judgment[66] in 2006.  However, he was not able to get to the substance of the appeal.  He was obliged to dismiss it on the basis that it was out of time, and that the court had no discretion to give relief from sanctions.
[34]   The John Abraham 2010 election petitions from Dominica alleged bribery and treating, illegal practices, returning voters and the Form 27 oath; that votes were wrongly admitted or rejected; a wrongful miscount; return of votes wrongly counted; and denial of access to the radio station.  The respondents filed interlocutory applications claiming that the petitions did not disclose any cause of action, or were misconceived;  that the claim pleaded corruption in vague and generalized terms;  that the petition disclosed no cause of action;  and that the alleged treating and illegal practices were unknown to the law of Dominica.  Errol Thomas J, in a 66-page ruling,[67] relying inter alia on the previously cited dicta[68] by Byron CJ in Thomas v Stoutt, struck out three of the five petitions, leaving two of them to go to trial.  He was also persuaded to follow a number of Indian and Malaysian decisions, without being advised as to the entirely different statutory regime of those countries.  He came to the conclusion that the civil procedure requirement for the pleading of full particulars of an alleged fraud in cases governed by the civil procedure rules applies also to an election petition.  He struck out the allegations of bribery, treating, and illegal practices on the basis that no sufficient particulars had been given.  He left the sole issues for trial as the disqualification of the respondents.  This being a ruling in an interlocutory application, there was no appeal to the Court of Appeal.  It is likely that, had Thomas J been pointed to the more relevant decisions of our courts and the UK courts, he might have come to a different decision.
[35]   In the Lindsay Grant 2010 petition in St Kitts, on an interlocutory application to strike out the petition, Indra Hariprashad-Charles J, in a 48-page ruling,[69] held that:
(a)     An allegation of misconduct by government requires the A-G to be joined;
(b)     A pleading of ‘bribery and treating’ requires material facts to be pleaded;
(c)     A pleading of ‘procuring a person to vote’ requires that the statutory regime for objecting should be followed, rather than pleading the matter in an election petition;
(d)     Similarly, a pleading that the recording officer made ‘inadequate arrangements to hear objections to voters’ should have followed the statutory regime for objecting at the time; and
(e)     Similarly, a pleading that an ‘illegal registration policy’ was in place should have followed the statutory regime for objecting at the time.
Although submissions were made to her that the correct procedure under the UK Rules did not require full particulars of an allegation of corrupt practices to be included in the election petition, but a respondent may apply for particulars, she appears to have come to the contrary finding, and she struck out the petition.  There being no appeal from an interlocutory decision of a High Court Judge in St Kitts in an election petition, her ruling could not be further tested.
[36]   It is difficult to understand how this long-established civil procedure rule on the need to particularise allegations of fraud in a writ, claim form, or statement of claim has crept into our election petition procedure.  Our present CPR 2000 contains no reference to petitions, or to the contents of petitions.  The previous civil procedure rules did apply to some petitions, but not to election petitions.  As long ago as 1968, Allen Lewis CJ held[70] in the Duporte appeal from St Kitts that the civil procedure rules are not generally applicable to election petitions; they are only applicable to the extent there is an express constitutional or statutory power that permits the rules to apply.
[37]   Thus, the old RSC, O.18.12 requiring parties to plead material facts in relation to all allegations of fraud in civil proceedings had no application to petitions.  Indeed, while the old RSC, O.9 did apply to some petitions, it required such a petition to contain only “a concise statement of the claim made or the relief or remedy required in the proceedings begun thereby.”  It is a necessary consequence of Lewis CJ’s decision that the civil procedure rule that a claimant may not plead fraud without giving particulars fraud does not displace the election petition rule that it is for a respondent to apply for particulars.
[38]   To conclude this point, it would appear that the reception of law sections of the relevant Eastern Caribbean Supreme Court Act, which applied the UK Rules to Dominica, were not brought to Rawlins J’s attention.  Nor, it appears, was he made aware of Sir Maurice’s judgment in the Anthony Ribeiro appeal which established that in election petitions, where our rules are silent, the UK Rules apply.  Had those provisions been brought to his attention, it is likely that he would have concluded that in Dominica, as in the UK, it is permissible for an election petition to plead corruption generally, and it is open to the respondent to apply for particulars, and that the petitioner is not obliged to give particulars in the petition.  It is quite possible that, had counsel brought these to his attention, his judgment might have been different.
[39]   Interlocutory applications to strike out petitions are sometimes wholly, sometimes partially, successful and sometimes not successful at all.  In Ronald Green’s 2010 petitions from Dominica, the petitioner obtained from the Registrar subpoenas against the respondents who had failed to file any witness statements of their own.  The petitioner was determined to force the respondents to testify against themselves.  The respondents applied to set aside the subpoenas and to strike out various witness statements issued on behalf of the petitioner.  Gertel Thom J,[71] in a 27-page ruling,[72] found for the respondents and she both set aside the subpoenas and ordered the impugned parts of the witness statements to be struck out.  Thereafter the matter proceeded to trial.
[40]   It is not unusual, on an application to strike out a petition, for some of the allegations made in the petition instead to be struck out for failure to comply with the rules, and for the matter otherwise to proceed to trial.  That was the conclusion Baptiste J came to in his 2005 ruling[73] on Rupert Herbert’s interlocutory application to strike out Lindsay Grant’s petition in St Kitts. 
HEARING THE PETITION IN THE HIGH COURT
[41]   Petitions occasionally survive the hazard of preliminary objections and proceed to trial.  There, they sometimes succeed, and sometimes they do not.  A petition challenging the conduct of the Returning Officer at the voting station may request that the trial judge conduct a scrutiny of the ballots to determine if they were correctly counted.  In an early Milton Cato election petition heard by Sir Eric Hallinan CJ of the Federal Supreme Court, sitting in his original jurisdiction in St Vincent, Mr Cato claimed that the returning officer had erroneously rejected a number of votes.  The Chief Justice directed the Registrar of the court to conduct a scrutiny of the rejected ballots, and to report back to the court.  On receipt of the report, and after trial, the Chief Justice decided[74] that, while the elections law made it mandatory for a voter to make a cross on the ballot paper, where the voter appeared to have made a genuine attempt to make a cross, his attempt should be treated as compliance.  Where the cross was in an ambiguous position, it will be a valid vote if after striking out all that was unessential for the cross it clearly indicated an intention to vote for the candidate who claimed it.  And, he dismissed the petition.
[42]   In the 1969 local government election case from Dominica of Active v Scobie, the question of the use of the pencil for voting arose again.  Neville Berridge J conducted a scrutiny limited to the ballots endorsed “rejected”.  Of the 48 under scrutiny, he disallowed 20 and, of the remaining 26, 10 were cast for the petitioner and 16 for the respondent.  The respondent having the majority of the votes, he therefore dismissed the petition and declared[75] the respondent duly elected and returned.
[43]   In the 1972 Emery Robertson election petition in St Vincent, the petitioner claimed various election offences, including that the respondent’s agent infringed the secrecy of the voting at a polling station by disclosing the names and numbers of persons who had voted at the station.  He sought a declaration that the respondent was not duly elected and that his election and return were wholly null and void.  The trial judge held[76] that the agent had communicated the information complained of and declared the election void.  On appeal, Cecil Lewis CJ held[77] that there was sufficient evidence to justify the trial judge’s finding of the illegal communication of information.  However, this finding could not be used as a basis for declaring the election void, because s.67 of the Constitution listed the offences on conviction whereof a candidate incurred the penalty of disqualification for membership of the Assembly and the avoidance of his election.  The offence in question was not one of those offences, and in any event no one had been successfully prosecuted for the offence.  The trial judge therefore had no authority to declare the appellant’s election void.  And he allowed the appeal.
[44]   Edison Lewis’ 1976 case challenged the election of Reuben Harris in Grenada on the ground that certain ballots should have been rejected because the marks made on them were in ink and not the pencil provided for at the polling station.  The trial judge scrutinised the rejected ballots and held that the ballots were valid and should have been counted as such.  The evidence showed that the respondent obtained the majority of the votes.  On appeal, Elwyn St Bernard JA held[78] that the judge’s conclusion was right since the irregularities and omissions complained of did not affect the results of the election.
[45]   Other problems may arise with the conduct of the elections on election day.  In Lindsay Grant’s 2004 election petition against Rupert Herbert’s election, allegedly because of irregularities committed by the Supervisor of Elections, Francis Belle J, in a 24-page judgment[79] after trial, found that the irregularities had not been proved and dismissed the petition.  The petition had survived the interlocutory process before Baptiste J described earlier,[80] but it finally collapsed when the court was not satisfied with the evidence of lack of impartiality of the Supervisor of Elections.
[46]   In the 2009 Dean Jonas election petitions from Antigua, Louise Blenman J, in a 133-page judgment,[81] dismissed most of the Petitioner’s claims.  She held that permitting voting after the statutory closing time did not breach the electoral law, and using an unlawful Photo List instead of the published Register of Voters represented substantial compliance with the law.  But, she declared the election void for failure to open the polling booth at 6 a.m. as required by the statute on the basis that voting was affected.  Compare Albert Redhead J’s earlier 1989 judgment in Donald Halstead’s election petition.  There had been substantive non-compliance with the rule as to the time for opening and closing of the poll, resulting in seven hours of not voting and three hours of voting outside the statutory period.  He held that,[82] while the time for opening and closing the poll is directory only and there is no breach if there is no compliance, on the basis of the evidence and the law, the elections might have been affected by the non-compliance, and on that basis the election was invalid.
[47]   Jacquie Quinn-Leandro appealed Blenman J’s judgment to the Court of Appeal.  Hugh Rawlins CJ, in a 103-page judgment,[83] allowed the appeal and held that, based on the evidence before the trial judge of the high percentage of the electorate that had in fact voted, voting had not been affected.  The trial judge had erred in holding that late voting was properly pleaded because the issue was not raised either on the facts pleaded in the petitions or by way of further particulars.  So, late voting was not a live issue, despite the petitioners seeking to bring it in subsequently in evidence that was presented at trial.  He concluded that the elections should not be declared invalid in any of the contested constituencies on the ground of substantial non-compliance with the electoral law.  The circumstances did not show that the breaches that occurred in the conduct of the election were substantial in the sense that a reasonable person would think that the election in each contested constituency was a sham or travesty, particularly given the high percentage of the electorate that voted in each contested constituency.  He found that the judge erred when she dismissed the statistical evidence adduced during the trial on the ground that she found them very unhelpful, without attempting to asses them.  He found that on an assessment of the statistical evidence it was highly improbable that the late opening of the polls affected the results.
[48]   Some candidates are not afraid of allowing their names to be put forward for nomination, even when they should know that they are disqualified by one statutory provision or the other.  In Waple Nedd’s 1972 appeal from Grenada, Allen Lewis CJ upheld[84] the finding by the trial judge that the appellant was disqualified on the basis that she was an election officer in the constituency.  In Dominica in 1995, Charles Savarin failed in his challenge on the basis of his opponent’s alleged disqualification.  Sir Vincent Floissac CJ overturned the decision of Odel Adams J and held[85] that the General Manager of a statutory corporation was not a public servant and was not disqualified by virtue of holding an office or appointment in a branch of the public service, as contended by Mr Savarin.
[49]   In Cedric Liburd’s 2010 petition against Eugene Hamilton’s election in St Kitts, Mr Liburd claimed that Mr Hamilton’s nomination, election and return were null and void as he was disqualified due to his being a US citizen.  The evidence disclosed that he was the holder of a Green Card, which merely gave him rights of residence, and was not evidence of his disqualification.  Indra Hariprashad-Charles J, in a 26-page judgment, dismissed[86] the petition.
[50]   Cedric Liburd and the Attorney-General both appealed Hariprashad-Charles J’s decision.  Davidson Baptiste JA, in a 24-page judgment,[87] held that the judge had correctly concluded that the evidence did not show that Mr Hamilton was under any acknowledgement of allegiance or obedience or adherence to any foreign power or state.  The question whether a person is by virtue of his own act under an acknowledgment of allegiance to a foreign state is to be determined in accordance with the provisions of the applicable foreign law.  There was no basis for upsetting the trial judge’s finding, and he dismissed both appeals.
[51]   In the Ronald Green petitions from Dominica, the claim was that the respondents were disqualified by reason of their foreign citizenship. The evidence was that they held French passports.  They claimed French citizenship by descent.  The petitions, having survived interlocutory challenges, came before Gertel Thom J who, in a 49-page judgment,[88] dismissed them on the basis that there was no proof that the respondents were disqualified by virtue of swearing allegiance to the foreign government.  Her decision was upheld[89] by the Court of Appeal.
[52]   In the Mark Brantley petition in the Nevis High Court against irregularities in the Nevis elections, Lionel Jones J, in a 146-page judgment,[90] allowed the petition in part and voided the election of Hensley Daniel.  But, he refused to order the names of the voters who were unlawfully removed from the Voters List to be restored.  In Joseph Parry and Hensley Daniel’s appeals against Jones J’s judgment, the Court of Appeal, in a 56-page judgment,[91] dismissed both appeals and granted Mr Brantley’s cross-appeal on the basis of bias and breach of a constitutional right to freedom of expression.  The returning officer’s failure to serve notices of objection to inclusion on the electoral roll, and the failure to publish the revised monthly lists, resulted in a failure to communicate adverse decisions to those affected, so that the decisions in question were in breach of the rules of natural justice, and a nullity. 
CONSTITUTIONAL MOTIONS
[53]   In recent years, it has become popular to file constitutional motions to challenge matters related to general elections.  One of the first was Randolph Russell’s 1994 constitutional motion complaining at the failure to appoint a Constituency Boundaries Commission and to register new voters.  Dunbar Cenac J had held[92] that, while the constitutional rights of the claimants had been infringed, damages would not be awarded, and the election would not be set aside.  On appeal, Sir Vincent Floissac CJ held[93] that the requirement to appoint a Constituency Boundaries Commission was directory rather than mandatory, and accordingly the general election would not be set aside.  In any event, the jurisdiction to determine the question as to be validity of elections to the House of Assembly and other questions referred to in s.36 of the Constitution has been excluded from the jurisdiction of the High Court conferred by s.96 because the former jurisdiction is a peculiar and special jurisdiction.  It is essentially a parliamentary jurisdiction conveniently assigned to the judiciary by the Constitution and by legislation.  The constitutional right to be registered to vote having been infringed damages could be awarded, and these should not be restricted to a nominal award but should acknowledge the significance and sanctity of the constitutional right.  The Privy Council affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeal and Lord Mustill, writing for the Board, dismissed[94] the appeal to it.
[54]   In the 2009 Shawn Richards case from St Kitts, fixed date claim forms were filed seeking judicial review and constitutional relief.  The claimants challenged the report of the Constituency Boundaries Commission; sought to quash the Commission’s report; claimed declarations; and sought an order of mandamus.  Errol Thomas J, in a 107-page judgment,[95] found that the National Assembly Resolution SRO18/2006 was null and void, as was the Proclamation giving effect to the Commission’s Report; and he granted an injunction preventing the bringing into effect of the Report.  He found the Attorney-General to have acted in contempt of court on the basis that he advised the Prime Minister that he could safely ignore an order of the court. 
[55]   On appeal by the A-G of St Kitts, Michael Gordon JA, in a 27-page judgment[96] delivered the following year, allowed the Attorney-General’s appeal and set aside the High Court orders.  He found that the evidence did not disclose a breach of the terms of the Judge’s order which had been prohibitory, not mandatory, and there was no allegation that the A-G did any act in breach of the order.  The evidence disclosed only that the A-G had failed to inform the Court of the Resolution pending before the National Assembly.  In any event, the contempt, if proved, would amount to a criminal contempt, not a private contempt, and which would have to be prosecuted by the DPP. 
[56]   In 2010 in Dominica, the Supervisor of Elections, Bernard Christopher, brought a constitutional motion claiming that he had been treated in a discriminatory manner in the matter of his calling for voter ID cards.  He claimed declarations that his constitutional rights had been violated, and sought injunctions and damages.  Birnie Stephenson J, in a 35-page judgment,[97] found that his claim did not show any cause of action against the Prime Minister;  he had not pleaded any material facts to prove discrimination;  and, he had failed to particularize any disabilities or restrictions or privileges or advantages others enjoyed which were denied to him.  She held that his claim was unmeritorious;  that he had no locus standi;  that his claim for an order of mandamus failed for his not having obtained leave in compliance with CPR 56.3;  and she granted the Prime Minister and the Attorney-General’s application to strike out the constitutional motion. 
[57]   The following year in Dominica, Birnie Stephenson J, delivered a 30-page ruling in a motion brought by Edison James for constitutional relief.  He claimed that the election writ was null and void;  that the election was unconstitutional;  and he sought damages.  The respondents filed an interlocutory application to strike out the motion on the basis that it showed no reasonable cause of action and was an abuse of the process of the court.  She dismissed[98] Mr James’ claim on the basis that, while there may have been a valid claim at the time the original election petitions were filed (and they were still pending) the whole issue raised in the motion was now academic and moot given that the claimant had regained his seat in a subsequent by-election.
[58]   Sometimes a constitutional motion goes to an extreme in demonstrating that it is not designed to be a substitute for an election petition.  So, in the 2002 St Lucia constitutional motion brought by Martinus Francois against the A-G, Francois claimed a declaration that the Prime Minister calling elections before the 5-year period provided in the Constitution was unconstitutional and deprived him of his fundamental rights.  The trial judge held[99] that there had been no contravention of the provisions of the Constitution, that no cause of action was disclosed, and dismissed the case with stinging costs of EC$20,000.00. 
[59]   Fran├žois appealed the High Court order to the Court of Appeal.  Dennis Byron CJ, in a 5-page judgment,[100] confirmed that general elections could lawfully be held at any time during the 5-year period.  Where the Constitution provides that the Governor General performs a function in his own deliberate judgment, or in accordance with the advice of, or after consultation with any other person, that function shall not be inquired into by any court.  Because the costs ordered in the High Court exceeded the permitted prescribed costs, he varied the costs order to EC$14,000.00 in the court below, and with EC$9,333.33 costs of the appeal, but otherwise he dismissed the appeal.  The entitlement of a successful party to an award of costs by the election court is not in doubt since the 1991 decision[101] of the Court of Appeal from Antigua in Hubert Henry’s case from Antigua.
[60]   Martinus Francois applied for leave to appeal to the Privy Council.  In a 3-page judgment[102] delivered the same day, Dennis Byron CJ, ruled that Mr Francois’ proposed interpretation of section 55 of the Constitution was so frivolous that it warranted no more than summary rejection, as it did not raise any genuinely disputable issue.  And, he dismissed the application.
[61]   Very recently there were the 117-page ruling and the 74-page judgment by Darshan Ramdhani J [AG] in the 2013 Shawn Richards Constituency Boundaries Commission case.  This was a challenge to the validity of the Report of the Boundaries Commission in St Kitts-Nevis.  The issues for trial were whether there was any justification for the allegation of the existence of a perception of bias, and whether the Commission had sufficiently consulted.  The trial judge granted[103] leave to bring judicial review and proceeded to hear the case.  At the end of the trial, he found[104] that there was no evidence of bias, but voided the Report and prohibited the Commission from submitting the Report to the Governor-General on the basis that it had not sufficiently consulted.
FIXED DATE CLAIM FORMS
[62]   Attempts to get around the stringent election petition constraints by resorting to the Fixed Date Claim Form procedure usually do not succeed.  So, in 2005 Julian Prevost filed a FDCF claiming that Mr Blackmore, who had been successful in the general elections, was not qualified to be nominated or elected as a Member of Parliament because he was disqualified under the Constitution being a special adviser to the Prime Minister.  On an interlocutory application to strike out the claim on the ground that it was unstainable, misconceived, frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of the court’s process, and had no prospect of success at a trial, Hugh Rawlins J determined[105] in a 10-page ruling that the proceedings should have commenced by petition rather than a FDCF, and he dismissed it.
[63]   In 2006, the Attorney-General of Grenada learned the hard way that there is no point in trying to avoid the stringent time limits for election petitions by instead filing a fixed date claim form.  When he challenged the election of Peter Charles David on the basis that he was a Canadian citizen, Kenneth Benjamin J upheld[106] the respondent’s application to strike out the claim on the basis that the High Court has no jurisdiction to challenge the validity of the election using the fixed date claim form procedure.
[64]   The A-G then applied to the Court of Appeal for leave to appeal.  This application was heard by teleconference by a single judge of the Court, and refused[107] on the basis that no leave could be given, as the decision of the High Court Judge was an interlocutory one from which no appeal lay in Grenada. 
[65]   The A-G nevertheless filed another application for an extension of time and proceeded to argue his appeal before the full Court.  Section 37(7) of the Grenada Constitution permits an appeal against a final order of a judge in an election petition, but not against an interlocutory order.  Michael Gordon JA, ruled that, notwithstanding the order previously made by the single judge refusing leave, the Court would proceed to deal with the new application.  He held in a 6-page judgment[108] that the trial judge’s order striking out the claim on an application by the respondent was not a final order.  The Court of Appeal therefore had no jurisdiction to hear the appeal.  He dismissed the application for an extension of time.  It was noticeable in this case that the A-G had not filed a Notice of Appeal upon which he could argue his appeal.  He was of the mistaken view that the form of notice of appeal, filed with his earlier, dismissed application for leave to appeal, was sufficient.
[66]   St Vincent and the Grenadines has seen its share of the fixed date claim form procedure being attempted as a substitute for election petitions.  So, in the 2011 Linton Lewis case, Gertel Thom J, in a 45-page judgment,[109] dealt with six applications.  Three of them were for leave to bring claims for judicial review of decisions of the Chief Magistrate and the DPP, and the other three of them were applications by the DPP and the Senior Magistrate to set aside leave previously granted.  The main issue before Thom J was the refusal of the Magistrate to issue criminal summonses under the Representation of the People Act against several successful candidates in the just-completed general elections.  They were accused of making false statements of fact in relation to the applicants’ personal characters.  Summonses had also been applied for against other persons who had registered in the wrong constituency.  The applications against the DPP alleged that he had brought up before himself several private criminal prosecutions filed by the applicants and had nolle prossed them.  He was accused of apparent bias on the basis that he had in the past been the PRO to the Prime Minister, and a junior in the PM’s law chambers;  of procedural unfairness;  and, of irrationality.  The judge refused the claimants’ three applications for leave to bring claims for judicial review on the basis that there was no realistic prospect of success.  She granted the DPP’s application for leave previously given in one of the matters to be set aside on the basis that material non-disclosure was established.  She dismissed the application of the Chief Magistrate to set aside the leave given to Ms Frederick to claim judicial review of her decision not to prosecute.  She ordered the remaining two claims of Ms Frederick for judicial review of the magistrate’s decision to proceed to trial. 
[67]   On appeal by the Chief Magistrate, Sonya Young, to the Court of Appeal, Dame Janice Pereira CJ, in a 16-page judgment,[110] held that the trial judge was correct to find that the evidence of mere past association of the DPP with the PM was not evidence of bias on the part of the DPP;  and that in the absence of evidence of fraud, dishonesty, mala fides, or corruption, a court would be loath to find that a DPP’s decision to nolle pross reviewable.  She dismissed the appeals of the claimants, and allowed the appeal of the Chief Magistrate.
[68]   In St Lucia there is an interesting and perhaps unique constitutional provision that permits the High Court to state a case to the Court of Appeal for a ruling on a matter of law.  In the 2012 Ezechiel Joseph matter, Hugh Rawlins CJ, in a 53-page judgment,[111] dealt with the question whether CPR 26.9 is available in an election petition in St Lucia for a party to apply for relief from sanctions, and whether disclosure under CPR 2000 is available to the parties.  He held that:
(a)     CPR 2000 does not apply to election petitions unless the rules so permit;
(b)     The St Lucia Elections Act provides the entire regime by which election petitions are governed; and
(c)     None of the interlocutory processes of CPR 2000 apply
And the matter was remitted to the high court for the petition to be heard.  It may be considered extraordinary that as recently as the year 2012 lawyers were seriously arguing that the civil procedure rules apply to election petitions.[112]
REFORM
[69]   There is a good argument that the elections legislation in our various States and Territories needs to be amended to set out clearly for the benefit of political candidates the grounds on which a petition may be based.  Serious errors may occur in an election, but based on the case law, may not be used as a ground for challenging an election.  So, an election will not be declared invalid by reason of any act or omission by the Returning Officer in breach of his official duty in connection with the election if the election was conducted substantially in accordance with the law, and the act or omission did not affect its result.  This means that in an election where there is a large majority of votes for one candidate there may be any number of procedural errors, but a petition is unlikely to be successful because the result would not have been affected.  The result is that those practices may continue until or unless a close election occurs.  Those responsible are never held accountable, lessons are not learned, and good practice is not established.
[70]   There is a good argument also that the question whether a candidate is disqualified should be dealt with administratively before the election, rather than by means of a petition following the election.  Apparent disqualification is at present not usually a ground for invalidating a candidate’s nomination.  The result is that the candidate may be elected even though he or she may be disqualified, leaving it for an expensive and uncertain challenge to be made through the courts.  In Anguilla there is a proposal[113] that the question be settled by authorising the Returning Officer on nomination day to call on the candidate to swear an oath as to his qualification.  Presumably, the draughtsman thinks that the threat of a prosecution for perjury will be more of an obstacle to unqualified persons offering themselves, than depending on a successful petition to the court after the election.  However, given that a large number of both elected and prospective candidates in Anguilla are reasonably suspected of being naturalised Canadian or US citizens, it is not thought likely that the amending Bill will get very far.
[71]   It is true for all our jurisdictions, so far as I am aware, that under the present rules the grounds of a petition may not be amended once submitted.  Once the statutory limit for filing a petition has passed, further grounds may not be added to an existing petition nor any new issues that arise be investigated even if they cast doubt on the validity of the result.  It is of concern that no matter how meritorious, the time for filing or amending a petition cannot be varied, even with the leave of the court.  There is a good argument to be made that the grounds of a petition should be able to be altered as new information that casts doubt on the validity of an election comes to light. 
[72]   Different decisions reached by different courts as to what exactly are the requirements of the law introduce uncertainty as to whether a petition will be struck out.  Particular difficulty is encountered in satisfying the court that sufficient particulars of fraud on the part of the successful candidate or his agents have been pleaded.  The previous practice of requiring a respondent to apply to the court for an order for further particulars of the alleged fraud, if he requires them, has ceased to be followed.  The civil procedure rule that fraud may not be pleaded generally, but must be particularized, has instead prevailed. 
[73]   It remains unclear whether Baptiste J’s 2005 Lindsay Grant decisions[114] represent the settled view on the need for a petition to give full particulars of an allegation of election fraud.  As we have seen, Rawlins J came to the same conclusion in his 2005 ruling[115] in the Ferdinand Frampton election petition from Dominica.  Hariprashad-Charles J took the same position in the Lindsay Grant petition[116] against the return of Glen Philip in the 2010 St Kitts elections.  Thomas J came to the same result[117] in the 2010 John Abraham election petition.
[74]   Sir Maurice’s previous 1979 decision[118] in Anthony Ribeiro suggests that it is possible that, were the matter of generalized pleadings of bribery and illegal practices to reach the Court of Appeal again, a different decision may be taken.  However, if a trial judge in a jurisdiction where no appeal in an election petition lies to the Court of Appeal were to follow the above-cited decisions on the need to plead full particulars of fraud, on an interlocutory application, the Court of Appeal would be powerless to intervene.  As we have seen, Baptiste J’s Lindsay Grant decisions were appealed to the Court of Appeal, but the issue was never argued as Alleyne CJ dismissed the appeal on the basis that the Court had no jurisdiction to entertain an interlocutory appeal in an election petition.[119]  The Ferdinand Frampton appeal was similarly dismissed[120] on a procedural ground without going to the issue.
[75]   The environment may be beginning to change.  After many heart-felt pleas by High Court Judges and others that the Chief Justice make rules in accordance with the provisions of our elections laws, our current Chief Justice has recently done so for the Federation of St Kitts and Nevis.[121]  These new Election Petitions Rules now provide, for that Federation at least, a detailed and modern code which should result in political candidates and lawyers finding the presentation of an election petition a more straightforward affair.  It is now clear in St Kitts-Nevis what is the meaning of a ‘corrupt practice’;[122]  what are to be the contents of the petition;[123]  the power of a judge to order particulars of an election offence;[124]  the requirement for the Registrar to publish notice of the petition;[125]  how a judge may vary the requirement for service;[126]  how notice of the security is to be served;[127]  in what circumstances a petition may be amended;[128]  how the petition may be withdrawn;[129]  how the petitioner may be substituted;[130]  how to add or substitute a respondent;[131]  how to consolidate several petitions relating to the same election;[132]  when the Returning Officer is to be a respondent;[133]  the mode of trial;[134]  the power of the judge to reserve a question of law for the Court of Appeal;[135]  the applicability of CPR 2000 in any matter not provided for by the Act or by these Rules;[136]  and, finally, precedents of the forms to be used in election petitions.[137] 
[76]   The introduction of these modern election petition rules is a major improvement on the previous confused situation that existed in St Kitts-Nevis concerning the correct rules to apply to election petitions.  However, in the absence of a clear rule on the matter, it may still fall for a Court of Appeal decision in the future to finally determine whether a St Kitts-Nevis election petition is required to plead full particulars of any election fraud or offence pleaded generally.  It may be said that the Rule 28 provision that CPR 2000 applies to election petitions where there is no specific rule has the consequence of importing the civil procedure rule against generalised pleadings of fraud.  The provision in Rule 4 that a judge may order particulars of an election offence may be held not to permit presenting a petition alleging election fraud generally without giving full particulars of the alleged fraud prior to the expiry of the time for presentment.  It would be a pity if this were so, as it must be nearly impossible for a candidate to discover the particulars of the fraud, acquire the necessary witness statements and other evidence, and draft, file and serve the election petition in the extremely short time provided in some jurisdictions.  It may be asked whether such an interpretation does not have the effect of encouraging and facilitating election fraud. 
[77]   Since parliament in Anguilla has deemed it appropriate for the rule-making power to be vested[138] in a High Court Judge, perhaps the High Court Judge could be persuaded, with the assistance of the Bar and the office of the Attorney-General of Anguilla to adopt the St Kitts-Nevis Rules with such amendment as may be necessary for Anguilla.  And, then, one may hope that the Chief Justice will in due course roll out the St Kitts-Nevis Rules for all the other States and Territories of our nine jurisdictions.  Hopefully, if this is done, the Chief Justice will take the opportunity to make it clear that election fraud may be generally pleaded, and it is for a respondent to apply for particulars of an alleged fraud to be given at some convenient time before the trial.
CONCLUSION
[78]   Our nine jurisdictions of the Eastern Caribbean Supreme Court fall into several distinct categories when considering election petitions.  The situation is fluid, and which category any one of us is located in changes from time to time.  The first, most traditional type is the country that has no election petition rules in its elections law, so that the UK Rules apply.  The second type is the country that has included in its election law a number of rules governing the presentment and hearing of an election petition, as Anguilla has, so that the reception of law provision in our Supreme Court Act no longer applies, and the UK Rules are excluded.  The third type is the country, like St Kitts-Nevis recently, that has persuaded the Chief Justice to make an extensive set of election petition rules, so that the UK Rules no longer apply. 
[79]   A political candidate must consider what legal process he or she should commence, depending on which of these three categories his country falls in, to ensure a fair election.  Such a challenge may be brought at different stages:  before, during, and after the election.   He may decide to bring a challenge to the registration process by filing an appeal to the High Court.  Alternatively, he may be advised to file a claim or to seek judicial review, or to file a constitutional motion, either before, during or after the election, depending on the wrong done and the relief sought.  Or, he may be advised to await the outcome of the election and to file a petition to challenge his opponent’s election. 
[80]   In each of our nine jurisdictions, the filing of an election petition after the election has concluded is the standard procedure for challenging the election of a candidate who it is alleged was wrongfully elected.  The jurisdiction to regulate membership in parliament is, in the constitutional theory of the separation of powers, vested in parliament itself.  The court has no place in determining the validity of the election of a member of the House, except to the extent that parliament has delegated that power to the court.  The rules governing the presentment of an election petition and its trial are onerous and restrictive.  The public policy behind this stance is the need to ensure that there is no delay in determining who the persons are who are entitled to form the government immediately after elections have ended.  This public policy has been determined by the courts of the UK and the West Indies to supersede the need to ensure that the election has been fairly conducted.  A challenge to an unfair election is permitted, but it must be prosecuted within strict guidelines and timetables. 
[81]   The interlocutory application to strike out an election petition is one of the strongest and most efficient mechanisms available to a successful candidate whose election is being challenged by a petition.  Even with the new election rules being rolled out, candidates and their lawyers will in the years to come continue to be ingenious and imaginative in attempting to persuade the court to strike out an election petition challenge filed against their election.  The courts on their part will continue to struggle to strike a balance between the imperatives of, on the one hand, ensuring that elections are conducted within the rules set by the Constitution and the elections statutes, and, on the other, of ensuring that candidates declared defeated at the polls do not unnecessarily hold up the formation of a new government immediately after an election has concluded.
12 September 2014

TABLE OF CASES CONSIDERED
A-G of Grenada v David [GDAHCV2006/?]                                   [63]
A-G of Grenada v David [GDAHCVAP2006/0018]                                [64], [65]
A-G of Grenada v David [GDAHCVAP2006/0034]                                [65]
A-G of St Kitts v Richards [SKBHCVAP2009/0009]                     [55]
Abraham v Darroux et al [DOMHCV2010/0003]                                     [34]
Active v Scobie and Davis (1969) 13 WIR 189                                     [42]
Beal v Smith (1865) LR 4CP 145                                                   [30]
Blanchette v Martin [SKBHCV2004/0184]                                              [31]
Blanchette v Martin [SKBHCVAP2005/0012 & 0012A]                          [31]
Brantley v Daniel [NEVHCV2011/0130]                                        [52]
Browne v Francis-Gibson (St Vincent Civ App No 11 of 1994)            [11]
Cato v Allen (1958) 1 WIR 68                                                        [41]
Chance v DPP [SVGHCV2011/0076]                                           [66]
Chance v DPP [SVGHCVAP2011/0025]                                               [67]
Christopher v Skerrit [DOMHCV2010/0287]                                 [56]
Clarke v George [SDKHCV2013/0331-0339]                              [20]
Duporte v Freeman (1968) 11 WIR 497                                       [36]
Fernandez v Maginley [ANUHCV2009/0144]                                [46]
Frampton v Pinard [DOMHCV2005/0149]                                              [32]
Frampton v Pinard [DOMHCVAP2005/0015]                               [33]
Francois v Compton [SLUHCV2002/000?]                                            [58]
Francois v Compton [SLUHCVAP2002/0008]                             [59], [60]
Frederick v DPP [SVGHCV2011/0021]                                        [66]
Frederick v DPP [SVGHCVAP2011/0024]                                            [67]
Frederick v George et al [DOMHCV2010/0003]                                    [34]
Frederick v Young [SVGHCV2011/0100]                                               [66]
Frederick v Young [SVGHCV2011/0115]                                               [66]
George & Penn-O’Neal v Parsons et al [BVIHCV2003/0098]              [28]
Grant v Herbert [SKBHCV2004/0182]                                           [31], [45]
Grant v Herbert [SKBHCVAP2005/0013 & 0013A]                     [24]
Grant v Phillip et al [SKBHCV2010/0026]                                               [35]
Green v Saint Jean [DOMHCV2010/0006]                                             [34]
Green v Saint Jean [(No 1) [DOMHCV2010/0006 & 0007]                   [39], [51]
Green v Saint Jean (No 2) [DOMHCV2010/0006]                                 [51]
Green v Saint Jean et al [DOMHCVAP2010/0001]                      [51]
Greene v Adams et al [ANUHCV2009/0148]                                [29]
Halstead v Simon (1989) 1 OECS LR 198                                             [46]
Hamilton v Liburd [SKBHCV2004/0183]                                       [31]
Hamilton v Liburd et al [SKBHCVAP2005/0011 & 0011A]                    [24]
Henry v Halstead (1991) 41 WIR 98                                             [59]
Henry v O’Loughlin (St Kitts Civ No ? of 1999)                                       [17]
Henry v O’Loughlin (St Kitts Civ App 12 of 1999)                                  [17]
James v George [SKBHCV2010/0222]                                        [18]
James v Speaker [DOMHCV2011/0199,0200]                                      [57]
James v Williams [SKBHCV2007/0097-0113]                                      [18]
Jonas v Quinn-Leandro [ANUHCV2009/0141]                             [46]
Joseph v Bowen et al (Antigua Civ No 40 of 1999)                      [26]
Joseph v Codrington [ANUHCV2009/0147]                                 [29]
Joseph v Reynolds [SLUHCVAP2012/0014]                               [68]
Joseph v Skerrit [DOMHCV2010/0007]                                        [34]
Lewis v DPP [SVGHCVAP20110026]                                          [67]
Lewis v Harris et al (1976) 23 WIR 170                                        [44]
Lewis v Williams [SVGHCV2011/0019]                                        [66]
Liburd v Hamilton [SKBHCV2010/0020]                                       [49]
Liburd v Hamilton [SKBHCBAP2011/0017, 0018]                                 [50]
Nedd v Simon (1972) 19 WIR 347                                                         [48]
Nibbs v Walker [ANUHCV2009/0144]                                           [46]
Parry v Brantley [NEVHCVAP2012/0003]                                              [52]
Payne v Jones (St Kitts Civ No 19 of 1984)                                  [25]
Prevost v Blackmore [DOMHCV2005/?]                                       [62]
Prime v Nimrod [GDAHCV2003/0251]                                          [28]
Quinn-Leandro v Jonas (2010) 78 WIR 216                                [48]
Radix v Gairy (1978) 25 WIR 553                                                  [19]
Richards v Boundaries Commission [SKBHCV2009/0159, 0179]       [54]
Richards v Boundaries Commission [SKBHCV2013/0241]                  [61]
Ribeiro v Simmonds 1 OECS Law Reports 165                                    [10]
Ribeiro v Simmonds (St Kitts Civ No 4 of 1978), unreported                [10]
Robertson v Tannis (St Vincent Civ No ? of 1972)                                [43]
Russell v A-G (1995) 50 WIR 127                                                 [53]
Russell v A-G (1997) 51 WIR 110                                                [53]
Sanford v Graneau et al [DOMHCV2010/0005]                                     [34]
Savarin v Williams (1995) 51 WIR 75                                           [47]
Simon v Spencer [ANUHCV2009/0142]                                       [46]
Smith v Christopher [BVIHCV2003/0097]                                              [27]
Stevens v Walwyn (1967) 12 WIR 51                                           [24]
Stephenson v DPP [SVGHCV2011/0020]                                             [66]
Stephenson v DPP [SVGHCVAP2011/0023]                              [67]
Tannis v Robertson (1973) 20 WIR 560                                       [43]
Thomas v Stoutt (1997) 55 WIR 112                                             [32]
Williams v Giraudy (St Lucia Civ No ? of 1975)                                      [22]
Williams v Giraudy et al (1975) 22 WIR 532                                 [22]
Williams v Giraudy (1978) 25 WIR 529                                         [22]
Young v Frederick [SVGHCVAP2011/0022]                                [67]



[1]               Paper prepared for a Panel Discussion held during the 11th Regional Law Conference of the OECS Bar Association, 12-14 September 2014, in Anguilla.  My thanks are due to my friends and colleagues, Ola Mae Edwards JA (Ret) who kindly reviewed the text for me, and made valuable suggestions; and Terence V Byron CMV of St Kitts, who generously shared his meticulous research, and Anthony Astaphan SC of Dominica who shared some of the more obscure cases; also to Pam Webster and Harry Wiggin of Websters; Joyce Kentish of Joyce Kentish & Associates; and Yvette Webster and Dana Campbell of Keithley Lake & Associates for the loan of their law libraries and help with research
[2]               It will be appreciated that this paper is not an exhaustive analysis of all the law and procedure on the topics dealt with, but only a survey of the relevant cases from the jurisdiction of the Eastern Caribbean Supreme Court.  Cases of other jurisdictions, particularly in the West Indies, will be essential for a complete argument to be presented on any of the issues dealt with here.  Additionally, the law and procedure vary from State to State within our jurisdiction, so that care must be taken with all precedents
[3]               This is the federal-type court with headquarters in St Lucia that serves the six independent Commonwealth Caribbean Countries of Grenada, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Saint Lucia, the Commonwealth of Dominica, Antigua and Barbuda, and St Kitts-Nevis, and the three British Overseas Territories of Montserrat, Anguilla and the Virgin Islands
[4]               The Electoral Commission: Challenging Elections in the UK, Report of September 2012
[5]               See Hudson Tannis v Emery Robertson at paragraph [43] below
[6]               Election Petition Rules, SI 1960/543 as amended
[7]               Halsbury’s Laws of England, 3rd edition (perhaps the 2nd edition is the more relevant for some States)
[8]               SH Day, Rogers on Elections. Vol II. Parliamentary Elections & Petitions With Appendices of Statutes, Rules and Forms (Seventeenth Edition, 1895, Stevens & Sons, London)
[9]               Parker, Frank R, The Powers, Duties & Liabilities of an Election Agent and of a Returning Officer at a Parliamentary Election in England and Wales, Including the Law and Practice of Election Petitions by the Late Frank R Parker, (Third Edition, edited by Oscar F Dowson)
[10]             Rory Mates and Andrew Scallan, Schofield’s Election Law (2nd Edition, Schaw & Sons) 1996 looseleaf edition
[11]             See Cato et al v Allen et al at paragraph [41] below;  Active v Scobie and Davis at paragraph [42] below;  and Edison Lewis v Reuben Harris at paragraph [44] below
[12]             See William Williams v Emmanuel Giraudy at paragraph [22] below; and Cato v Allen at paragraph [41] below;  and Donald Halstead v Henderson Simon at paragraph [46] below and Dean Jonas v Jacqui Quinn-Leandro at para [46] below;  and Jacqui Quinn-Leandro v Dean Jonas at paragraph [47] below;
[13]             See Lindsay Grant v Rupert Herbert, at paragraph [31] below;  and Ferdinand Frampton v Ian Pinard at paragraph [32] below; and John Abraham v Kelver Darroux at paragraph [34] below;  and Emery Robertson v Hudson Tannis at paragraph [43] below
[14]             See Waple Nedd v Vernon Simon at paragraph [48] below; and Charles Savarin v John Williams at paragraph [47] below
[15]             Parker, p. 671
[16]             Kennedy Simmonds v Anthony Ribeiro [2 OECS Law Reports 165], per Cecil Hewlett J, from St Kitts
[17]             Anthony Ribeiro v Kennedy Simmonds [2 OECS Law Reports 179], per Sir Maurice Davis CJ, delivered 13 March 1979, from St Kitts
[18]             The West Indies Associated States Supreme Court (St Christopher, Nevis and Anguilla) Act, 1975, sections 11(1) and 6(3)
[19]             Michael Browne v Yvonne Francis-Gibson (Civ App No 11 of 1994), per Sir Vincent Floissac CJ, unreported, from St Vincent
[20]             See George Prime v Elvin Nimrod at paragraph [28] below
[21]             Then a High Court Judge, but later a Justice of Appeal
[22]             See Lindsay Grant v Rupert Herbert at paragraph [31] below
[23]             Elections Act, RSA c E30
[24]             A bright young lawyer representing a disappointed candidate may one day successfully challenge them as an infringement of the “fair trial” provisions of the Constitution
[25]             See Stevens v Walwyn at paragraph [24] below
[26]             Terence Henry v Leonard O’Loughlin (Civ No ? of 1999), per Neville Smith J, from St Kitts, unreported
[27]             Terence Henry v Leonard O’Loughlin (Civ App 12/1999), from St Kitts, unreported
[28]             Laureen James v Dudley Williams [SKBHCV2007/0097-0113], per Francis Belle J, delivered 18 June 2007, from St Kitts
[29]             Laureen James et al v Wingrove George [SKBHCV2010/0222], per Errol Thomas J, delivered 13 May 2013, from St Kitts
[30]             Radix v Gairy (1978) 25 WIR 553, per Sir Maurice Davis CJ, delivered 19 September 1978, from Grenada
[31]             Cherita Clarke v Wingrove George [SKBHCV2013/0331-0339], per Darshan Ramdhani J, delivered 27 August 2014, from St Kitts
[32]             William Williams v Emanuel Giraudy et al (Civ No ? of 1975) per Bruno J, delivered 10 January 1975, from St Lucia
[33]             William Williams v Emanuel Giraudy and Eudes Bourne (1975) 22 WIR 532; per Sir Maurice Davis CJ, delivered 10 January 1975, from St Lucia
[34]             William Williams v Emanuel Giraudy and Eudes Bourne (1978) 25 WIR WIAS 529, with separate judgments by Elwyn St Bernard JA and Neville Berridge JA [AG], delivered 27 February 1978, from St Lucia
[35]             See Eugene Hamilton v Cedric Liburd et al at paragraph [31] below
[36]             See A-G of Grenada v Peter Charles David at paragraph [65] below
[37]             By section 41(2) of the Anguilla Constitution 1982, see paragraph [2] above
[38]             See Section 41(2) of the Anguilla Constitution 1982
[39]             See Daven Joseph v Chandler Codrington at paragraph [29] below
[40]             See George Prime v Elvin Nimrod at paragraph [28] below
[41]             See Michael Browne v Yvonne Francis-Gibson at paragraph [11] above
[42]             See Ethlyn Smith v Delores Christopher at paragraph [27] below
[43]             See Ethlyn Smith v Delores Christopher at paragraph [27] below
[44]             See Shemilita Joseph v Sherwin Bowen at paragraph [26] below; and Daven Joseph v Chandler Codrington at paragraph [29] below
[45]             See William Williams v Emanuel Giraudy at paragraph [22] above
[46]             Stevens v Walwyn (1967) 12 WIR 51, per Elwyn St Bernard JA, delivered 26 July 1997, from Nevis
[47]             Then a High Court Judge, later a Justice of Appeal
[48]             St John Payne v Roy Jones 1984 (Civ No 19 of 1984) per Satrohan Singh J, from St Kitts, unreported
[49]             Then a High Court Judge, later Chief Justice of Belize
[50]             Shemilita Joseph v Sherwin Bowen et al (Civ No 40 of 1999), per Kenneth Benjamin J, from Antigua, unreported
[51]             Then a High Court Judge, but later Sir Hugh Rawlins, CJ
[52]             Ethlyn Smith v Delores Christopher & Supervisor of Elections; and Reeial George and Irene Penn-O’Neal v Eileen Parsons;  and Paul Wattley v Supervisor of Elections [BVIHCV2003/0097, 0098], per Hugh Rawlins J; delivered 23 July 2003, from the Virgin Islands
[53]             George Prime v Elvin Nimrod [GDAHCV2003/251], per Charmaine Pemberton J, delivered 19 March 2004, from Grenada
[54]             Then a High Court Judge, but later a Justice of Appeal
[55]             Daven Joseph v Chandler Codrington et al ; Paul Greene v Eleston Adams et al [ANUHCV2009/0147, 0148], per Louise Blenman J, delivered 30 June 2009, from Antigua
[56]             Beal v Smith (1865) LR 4CP 145
[57]             Atkins Court Forms, 2nd Edition, Vol 18, on Elections, para 8, captioned “Election Petitions, at page 129
[58]             Halsbury’s Laws of England, 3rd Edition, Vol 14 on Elections at para 444 on “Contents and form of petition”
[59]             Lindsay Grant v Rupert Herbert et al [SKBHCV2004/0182]; Eugene Hamilton v Cedric Liburd [SKBHCV2004/0183]; Glenroy Blanchette v Earl Martin [SKBHCV2004/0184], per Davidson Baptiste J, delivered 27 July 2005, from St Kitts, unreported
[60]             See Anthony Ribeiro v Kennedy Simmonds at paragraph [10] above
[61]             Eugene Hamilton v Cedric Liburd et al [SKBHCVAP2005/0011&0011A; Glenroy Blanchette v Earl Martin [SKBHCVAP2005/0012&0012A]; Lindsay Grant v Rupert Herbert [SKBHCVAP2005/13&13A], per Brian Alleyne CJ, delivered 3 April 2006, from St Kitts
[62]             See Beal v Smith at paragraph [30] above
[63]             Ferdinand Frampton v Ian Pinard et al [DOMHCV2005/0149], per Hugh Rawlins J, delivered 28 October 2005, from Dominica
[64]             Later, as a member of the Privy Council, styled the Rt Hon Sir Dennis Byron CJ, and presently the President of the Caribbean Court of Justice
[65]             Thomas v Stoutt (1997) 55 WIR 112, per Dennis Byron CJ [AG], from the Virgin Islands
[66]             Ferdinand Frampton v Ian Pinard et al [DOMHCVAP2005/0015], per Denys Barrow JA, delivered 3 April 2006, from Dominica
[67]             John Abraham v Kelver Darroux et al; and Bobby Frederick v Ambrose George et al; and Claudius Sanford v Graneau et al; and Ronald Green v Petter Saint Jean et al;  and Maynard Joseph v Roosevelt Skerrit et al [DOMHCV2010/0003,4,5,6,7], per Errol Thomas J, delivered 25 August 2010, from Dominica
[68]             See Thomas v Stoutt at paragraph [32] above
[69]             Lindsay Grant v Glen Phillip et al [SKBHCV2010/0026], per Indra Hariprashad-Charles J, delivered 4 November 2010, from St Kitts
[70]             Duporte v Freeman (1968)11 WIR 497, per Allen Lewis CJ, from St Kitts
[71]             Then a High Court Judge, subsequently a Justice of the Court of Appeal
[72]             Ronald Green v Petter Saint Jean and Maynard Joseph v Roosevelt Skerrit et al (No 1) [DOMHCV2010/006&7], per Gertel Thom J, delivered 10 January 2012, from Dominica
[73]             See Lindsay Grant v Rupert Herbert et al at paragraph [31] above
[74]             Cato et al v Allen et al (1958) 1 WIR 68, per Sir Eric Hallinan CJ, delivered 12 July 1958, from St Vincent
[75]             Active v Scobie (1969) 13 WIR 189, per Neville Berridge J, delivered 20 January 1969, from Dominica
[76]             Emery Robertson v Hudson Tannis (Civ No ? of 1972); from St Vincent, unreported
[77]             Hudson Tannis v Emery Robertson (1973) 20 WIR 560, per Cecil Lewis CJ [AG], delivered 14 March 1973, from St Vincent
[78]             Edison Lewis v Reuben Harris et al (1976) 23 WIR 170, per Elwyn St Bernard JA, delivered 29 October 1976, from Grenada
[79]             Lindsay Grant v Rupert Herbert [SKBHCV2004/0182], per Francis Belle J, delivered 12 July 2006, from St Kitts
[80]             See Lindsay Grant v Rupert Herbert at paragraph [31] above
[81]             Dean Jonas v Jacqui Quinn-Leandro et al; and St Clair Simon v Winston Baldwin Spencer et al; and Arthur Nibbs v Trevor Walker et al; and Charles Fernandez v John Maginley et al [ANUHCV2009/0141, 0142, 0143, 0144], per Louise Blenman J, delivered 31 March 2010, from Antigua
[82]             Donald Halstead v Henderson Simon et al (1989) 1 OECS LR 198, per Albert Redhead J, delivered 30 June 1989, from Antigua
[83]             Jacqui Quinn-Leandro v Dean Jonas (2010) 78 WIR, 216, per Hugh Rawlins CJ, delivered 27 October 2010, from Antigua
[84]             Waple Nedd v Vernon Simon (1972) 19 WIR 347, per Allen Lewis CJ, delivered 25 July 1972, from Grenada
[85]             Charles Savarin v John Williams (1995) 51 WIR 75, per Sir Vincent Floissac CJ, delivered 31 October 1995, from Antigua
[86]             Cedric Liburd v Eugene Hamilton et al [SKBHCV2010/0020], per Indra Hariprashad-Charles J, delivered 13 October 2010, from St Kitts
[87]             Cedric Liburd v Eugene Hamilton [SKBHCVAP2011/0017, 0018], per Davidson Baptiste JA, delivered 27 August 2012, from St Kitts
[88]             Ronald Green v Petter Saint Jean et all and Maynard Joseph v Roosevelt Skerrit et al (No 2) [DOMHCV2010/6&7], per Gertel Thom J, delivered 10 January 2010, from Dominica
[89]             Ronald Green v Petter Saint Jean [DOMHCVAP2012/0001], per Dame Janice Pereira C-J, delivered 11 March 2013, from Dominica, unreported
[90]             Mark Brantley v Hensley Daniel [NEVHCV2011/0130], per Lionel Jones J, delivered 21 March 2012, from Nevis
[91]             Joseph Parry v Mark Brantley [NEVHCVAP2012/003], per Don Mitchell JA [AG], delivered 27 August 2012, from Nevis
[92]             Randolph Russell v A-G (Civ No ? of 1994), per Dunbar Cenac J, delivered 20 June 1994, from St Vincent
[93]             Randolph Russell et al v A-G (1995) 50 WIR 127, per Sir Vincent Floissac CJ, delivered 24 March 1995, from St Vincent
[94]             Randolph Russell v A-G (1997) 51 WIR 10, per Lord Mustill, delivered 15 May 1997, from St Vincent
[95]             Shawn Richards v Boundaries Commission [SKBHCV2009/0159, 0179], per Errol Thomas J, 29 October 2009 reissue, from St Kitts
[96]             A-G of St Kitts v Shawn Richards [SKBHCVAP2009/0009], per Michael Gordon JA, delivered 13 September 2009, from St Kitts
[97]             Bernard Christopher v Roosevelt Skerrit et al [DOMHCV2010/0287], per Birnie Stephenson J, delivered 18 February 2011, from Dominica
[98]             Edison James v Speaker of the House of Assembly et al [DOMHCV2010/199&200], per Birnie Stephenson J, delivered 10 June 2011, from Dominica
[99]             Martinus Francois v Petrus Compton [SLUHCV2002/?], from St Lucia, unreported
[100]            Martinus Francios v Petrus Compton [SLUHCVAP2002/0008] (No 1), per Dennis Byron CJ, delivered 18 June 2003, from St Lucia
[101]            Hubert Henry v Donald Halstead (1991) 41 WIR 98; per Sir Vincent Floissac CJ, delivered 29 November 1991, from Antigua
[102]            Martinus Francois v Petrus Compton (No 2) [SLUHCVAP2002/0008], per Dennis Byron CJ, delivered 18 June 2003, from St Lucia
[103]            Shawn Richards v Constituency Boundaries Commission (1)  [SKBHCV2013/0241], per Darshan Ramdhani J, delivered 25 November 2013, from St Kitts
[104]            Shawn Richards v Constituency Boundaries Commission (2) [SKBHCV2013/0241], per Davidson Baptiste J, delivered 31 July 2014, from St Kitts
[105]            Julian Prevost v Rayburn Blackmore [DOMHCV2005/?], per Hugh Rawlins J, from Dominica, unreported
[106]            A-G of Grenada v Peter Charles David [GDAHCV2006/?], per Kenneth Benjamin J, from Grenada, unreported
[107]            A-G of Grenada v Peter Charles David et al [GDAHCVAP2006/0018], delivered 31 October 2006, unreported
[108]            A-G of Grenada v Peter Charles David et al [GDAHCVAP2006/0034], per Michael Gordon JA, delivered 2 June 2008
[109]            Linton Lewis v Colin Williams et al [SVGHCV2011/0019]; Nigel Stephenson v DPP et al [SVGHCV2011/0020]; Vynette Frederick v DPP et al [SVGHCV2011/0021]; Patricia Chance v DPP [SVGHCV2011/0076]; Vynette Frederick v Sonya Young [SVGHCV2011/0100]; Vynette Frederick v Sonya Young [SVGHCV2011/0115], per Gertel Thom J, delivered 15 November 2011, from St Vincent
[110]            Sonya Young v Vynette Frederick [SVGHCVAP2011/0022]; Nigel Stephenson v DPP et al [SVGHCVAP2011/0023]; Vynette Frederick v DPP et al [SVGHCVAP2011/0024]; Patricia Marva Chance v DPP [SVGHCVAP2011/0025]; Linton Lewis v DPP et al [SVGHCVAP2011/0026], per Dame Janice Pereira CJ, delivered 31 May 2012, from St Vincent
[111]            Ezechiel Joseph v Alvin Reynolds [SLUHCVAP2012/0014], per Sir Hugh Rawlins CJ, delivered 31 July 2012, from St Lucia
[112]            Despite the judgments of our Court of Appeal in Ribeiro v Simmonds per Sir Maurice Davis CJ in 1977, see paragraph [10] above;  and Michael Browne v Yvonne Francis-Gibson, per Sir Vincent Floissac CJ, in 1997, see paragraph [11] above
[113]            The Elections (Amendment) Bill, 2014
[114]            See Lindsay Grant v Rupert Herbert et al at paragraph [12] above
[115]            See Ferdinand Frampton v Ian Pinard et al at paragraph [32] above
[116]            See Lindsay Grant v Glen Philip et al at paragraph [35] above
[117]            See John Abraham v Kelver Darroux at paragraph [34] above
[118]            See Anthony Ribeiro v Kennedy Simmonds at paragraph [10] above
[119]            See Eugene Hamilton v Cedric Liburd et al at paragraph [31]
[120]            See Ferdinand Frampton v Ian Pinard at paragraph [10] above
[121]            The National Assembly (Election Petitions) Rules, 2014, SRO No 4 of 2014
[122]            Rule 2
[123]            Rule 3
[124]            Rule 4
[125]            Rule 7
[126]            Rule 8
[127]            Rule 9
[128]            Rule 12
[129]            Rule 13
[130]            Rule 14
[131]            Rule 16
[132]            Rule 19
[133]            Rule 21
[134]            Rule 23
[135]            Rule 24
[136]            Rule 28
[137]            Rule 29
[138]            See the Elections Act, section 64(2), at paragraph [15] above